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Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are contractual figures through which the public and private 
sectors participate together in the provision of public goods and services, with multiple 
degrees of involvement and allocation of responsibilities, and multiple types of arrangements 
such as concessions (PPP in Infrastructure Resource Center [PPPIRC], 2015). Thus, an 
adequate risk distribution among the parties is required to ensure the success of a project. 
Although there is extensive research to understand risk in PPP at the national level, it has 
been found that there is a lack of research on the role of political risk and critical success 
factors coming from subnational spheres, on PPP success. 
Therefore, the current study related perceptions on political risk, and critical success factors 
with the probability of success or failure of an infrastructure project performed under 
concessions at the subnational level. The types of political risk included were: (a) currency 
inconvertibility, (b) breach of contract, (c) expropriation, (d) political violence, (e) legal and 
bureaucratic risk, and (f) non-governmental actions. Meanwhile, the critical success factors 
involved were: (a) favourable economic conditions, (b) available financial markets, (c) 
effective procurement and (d) government guarantee (Hardcastle et al., 2005). These factors 
were related through structural equation modelling (SEM). 
Results showed that both critical success factors and political risk factors were found to have 
a significant relationship with the success or failure of PPP in infrastructure projects at the 
subnational levels. There was a statistically significant, positive relationship, between critical 
success factors and success of public-private partnership infrastructure projects. Furthermore, 
there was a statistically significant, positive, indirect effect of political risk factors on success, 
following the idea that properly identified critical success factors and political success factors 
influence the final outcome of a project at the subnational level. In turn, political risk factors 
had a statistically significant effect on critical success factors, thus proving the relationship 
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between both constructs found in the literature. These results confirmed the importance of 
both political risk and critical success factors on PPP success or failure, as well as remarking 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A growing presence of the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), associations between 
public and private parties for the partial involvement of the latter on the provision of public 
goods or services, has been registered around the world in the last three decades. While the 
number of infrastructure projects developed through PPPs around the world was 57 in 1990, 
this number ascended to 242 in 2016 for developing and emerging countries (World Bank, 
2017a). More precisely, the total number of PPPs in infrastructure projects was 6,981 
between 1990 and 2016, which meant a total investment equivalent to 2’589,812 million 
dollars (Private Participation in Infrastructure Database [PPID], 2017). 
So, PPPs were seen as a preferred way or an intermediate option in the private sector in 
their participation in the provision of public goods, as compared to the option of 
privatizations (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Navarro & Hernández, 
2009). More accurately, “PPPs are hailed as the main alternative to contracting out and 
privatization, and thus they are seen as a qualitative jump ahead in the effort to combine the 
strong sides of the public sector and the private sector” (Hodge & Greve, 2007, p. 545). In 
this regard, PPPs have turned into a relevant tool for the development of sectors such as 
health, infrastructure, education, environment, finance, government and agriculture around 
the world (Bennett, Grohmann, & Gentry, 1999; Buse & Walt, 2000; Fiszbein & Lowden, 
1999). For that reason, it is possible to promote research and development (R&D) through 
these alliances, which is important for accelerating economic growth (Faulkner & Senker, 
1994; Spielman & Von Grebmer 2004). So, Moszoro (2010) mentioned that: 
The provision of public goods provides a strong rationale for public-private hybrids 
that can efficiently carry out public investment projects. PPPs are gaining momentum, 
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both for governments seeking efficient solutions to public services and for investors 
as an asset class. (p. 1) 
Empirical data shows proof of this phenomenon. According to Blanc, Goldsmith, and 
Välilä (2007), an increase in the number of PPPs in Europe was seen during the last three 
decades. While two PPP projects were signed in Europe during 1990, this number ascended 
to 152 in 2006.  
According to the European Investment Bank (2017), 1,765 PPP projects were 
developed in Europe between 1990 and 2016, for a total amount of 355.9 billion euros. Of 
these PPP projects, 88.95% were conducted in the following countries: United Kingdom 
(58.19%), France (9.92%), Spain (9.07%), Germany (6.91%), Portugal (2.49%) and the 
Netherlands (2.38%). Compared to the information until 2006, the share of projects 
developed in the United Kingdom decreased, showing a greater adoption of PPPs in 
continental Europe.  
 In global terms, Latin America was found to be the region with the highest number of 
PPPs between 1990 and 2016, with a total of 2270 projects, with an investment amounting 
for 1,017,459 million US dollars (PPID, 2017). In fact, these projects have become key for 
infrastructure deployment in the region, representing 76% of total private investment on 
infrastructure between 2006 and 2015, amounting for 1% of regional GDP. Conversely, 
Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa invested 1.6% and 0.8% of their GDP on PPP 
infrastructure projects, respectively (Michelitsch, et al.; 2017). 
This greater presence of infrastructure PPPs in Latin America (PPID, 2017) is an 
indicator of the use of PPPs in developing countries. On that subject, Akitoby, Hemming, and 
Schwartz (2007) stated that “infrastructure needs and financing constraints are more severe in 
developing countries” (p. 1) because of which “it is mandatory to maintain fiscal discipline 
and respect the limits on taxes and debt, which represent the usual sources of funding for 
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public investment” (p. 1; free translation from the original in Spanish. Meanwhile, Sachs, 
Tiong, and Wang (2007) recognised that the private sector has positioned as an important 
source of funding for innovative PPP projects in emerging economies. 
Meanwhile, and according to PPID (2017), Colombia is shown in global terms to be 
the ninth country in the total number of infrastructure PPP projects (184 projects), and the 
twelfth country regarding the total value of such investments (64,053 million US dollars). 
Regionally, Colombia is placed in fourth place on the number of PPP projects and fifth place 
on the total investment level (PPID, 2017). On the other hand, from all PPPs developed 
between 1990 and 2016, 58 of these projects, 31.52 % of total, were road projects (PPID, 
2017), of which 10.34% were allocated under build, operate and transfer (BOT), 72.41% 
were allocated through build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer (BROT), 1.72% were 
allocated through a management contract, and 15.52% were contracted through rehabilitate, 
operate and transfer (ROT). 
 Regarding the situation of road infrastructure in Colombia, Zamora and Barrera 
(2012) concluded that “Colombia presents a backlog in road infrastructure, there are 
deficiencies or shortages in bridges, viaducts, tunnels, embankments and roads which subtract 
productivity and competitiveness at the moment of facing a market open to big 
conglomerates” (p. 16; free translation from the original Spanish languaje). In turn, Colombia 
is ranked 110
th 
out of 137 countries on infrastructure quality (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Given this situation, investment in road infrastructure becomes imperative nevertheless 
public resources are limited, thus requiring private investment (FEDESARROLLO, 2012). 
This popularity increase has occurred on both developed and developing countries. 
Behind this surge, there are motivations related to budget constraints faced by governments, 
which hinder traditional public hiring and promote the presence of private participation 
(Akitoby et al., 2007). Also, its capability to combine long-term public planning and social 
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responsibility with private financing and experience; there is also political backlash against 
privatisations, especially among developing countries, which leads PPPs to look  like an 
alternative (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2009a; Moszoro, 2010; Shediac, Abouchakra, 
Hammami & Najjar, 2008). 
The aforementioned allocation task leads to a distribution of risks between the private 
and public sectors (Kappeler & Nemozm, 2010), as proper identification of  risks (Nocco & 
Stulz, 2006) in these projects is key to ensure their success. According to Sachs and Tiong 
(2009), political risk becomes more important for developing countries, as these are more 
exposed to contract breaches, corruption, currency inconvertibility, non-governmental actions 
and political violence. The latter is especially in transition economies, such as Colombia, 
where the study took place, given the general political situation of the country. 
For a project carried out through a PPP to be successful, it is important to conduct a 
proper identification of these risks, for which multiple risk analysis and techniques are 
employed (PRS Group, 2013; Moody's, 2007 [as cited in Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton, & 
Stevenson, 2012]; Ye & Tiong, 2000; Soennen & Johnson, 2008; Sachs & Tiong, 2009). 
However, these techniques only take into account the national dimension, ignoring 
subnational differences. In Colombia, such differences in risk are marked enough to requiere 
special analysis, especially on political violence levels (Vargas, 2011). Given the recent 
formal adoption of PPPs in the country, and the similarities between Colombia´s political and 
economic situation with that in numerous countries around the world, it is important to 
perform a proper identification of the subnational perceptions on political risk, encompassing 
six different types of risk and critical success factors, with the probability of success or 
failure of a infrastructure project performed under the figure of concessions in the form of a 
PPP. 
Therefore, the current research was related to the perceptions of subnational authorities 
on political risk, including currency inconvertibility, breach of contract, expropriation, 
political violence, legal and bureaucratic risk, and non-governmental actions, as well as 
5 
 
critical success factors, such as financing access, economic environment, adequate 
procurement and government guarantees, to assess the probability of failure and success for a 
project. These relationships were found by using structural equation modelling (SEM). 
Concessions were used as a proxy for PPP projects, given the novel implementation of the 
latter and the lengthy experience of the country on the former. 
Background of the Problem 
Regarding the provision of public goods, such as those managed by PPP, Navarro and 
Hernández (2009) pointed that “models of delivery of public goods and services can be 
understood as a continuum of formulas which has its two polar ways in the direct provision 
by governments and the full privatization of that” (p. 1). 
According to Holcombe (1997), public goods are defined as: 
A good that, once produced, can be consumed by an additional consumer at no 
additional cost. A second characteristic is sometimes added, specifying that 
consumers cannot be excluded from consuming the public good once it is produced. 
Goods with these characteristics will be underproduced in the private sector, or may 
not be produced at all, following the conventional wisdom, so economic efficiency 
requires that the government force people to contribute to the production of public 
goods, and then allow all citizens to consume them. (p. 1) 
The infrastructure goods and services delivered through PPPs, according to PPID 
(2017), can be divided into: (a) energy (electricity and natural gas), (b) telecommunications, 
(c) transport (airports, railroads, roads and seaports), (d) and water and sewerage (treatment 
plants and utility). The current research was focused on road infrastructure.  
Among the benefits associated to PPPs, Jamali (2004) indicated that the importance of 
these partnerships lies on finding the point where the comparative advantages of both sectors 
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are fully exploited; for example, the private sector would have: (a) dynamism, (b) access to 
financing, (c) technological knowledge, (d) managerial efficiency, and (e) entrepreneurial 
spirit. In contrast, the public sector possesses: (a) social responsibility, (b) environmental 
awareness, and (c) a concern for job creation. In this sense, the surge in the design and 
execution of PPPs has been increasing, which has sparked interest in investigating this kind 
of investments. Girard, Mohr, Deller, and Halstead (2009) indicated that studies on PPPs 
flourished in the last 20 years. 
According to Sachs et al. (2007) PPP-based projects require risk management 
mechanisms both in the moment of investment and for carrying its execution, even more so in 
developing countries, which present the highest incidence and exposure to risks, especially, 
the associated with political risk. This consideration gains relevance given the fact that 
developing countries are those who have made greater use of such agreements (PPID, 2017). 
Regarding the risks associated to a PPP investment, Figure 1 shows risk allocations for 





Figure 1. Risk allocation in the provision of public goods between the public and private 
sectors. Adapted from “Are Public-Private Partnerships a Healthy Option? A Systematic 
Literature Review,” by J. K. Roehrich, M. A. Lewis and G. George, 2014, Social Science & 
Medicine, 113, p. 111.  
Also, it is important to point out that a fundamental difference between the traditional 
procurement model, privatisation and PPPs lies on the risk allocation that occurs between the 
public and private sectors:  
Along with the integration of multiple tasks, there is a substantial transfer of risks to 
the private party […] this distinguishes PPP from more traditional forms of 
procurement, in which most of the risks are usually borne by the public party. In the 
PPP-contract risks are allocated between the public and private party, and this will 
also determine e.g. ownership of the asset, liability, restrictions in operation for the 
private party, etc. (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010, p. 6) 
Given the above, Grimsey and Lewis (2000) created a taxonomy for PPP risks,  for 
infrastructure projects. These authors identified: (a) technical risk, related to design and 
engineering flaws; (b) construction risk, i.e. problems by faulty construction, cost overruns 
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and expiration of terms; (c) operative risk, meaning higher maintenance and operation costs; 
(d) income risk, lower benefits caused by a revenue deficit; (e) financial risk, which emerges 
by inadequate coverage for cash flows and financing costs; (f) force majeure risk, related to 
war and other calamities; (g) regulatory and political risk, created by legal changes and low 
support in governmental policies; (h) environmental risk, negative externalities of 
meteorological character; and (i) project default risk, i.e., the project failure after a 
combination of the mentioned factors. In turn, Sachs et al. (2007) highlighted the importance 
of knowing the risks involved in decision making for investments and PPP. However, these 
authors centred their study in the political risk impact, as defined by the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, 1985), who defined six political risk factors: (a) 
restrictions to convertibility, (b) expropriation, (c) breach of contract, (d) political violence, 
(e) legal and bureaucratic risk, and (f) non-governmental actions. 
Political risk can alter international investment treaties and agreements. For that 
reason, Sachs et al. (2007) studied this category of risk for investments through PPPs in 
China and other Asian countries, among these Indonesia and Vietnam, where they were able 
to prove that, indeed, political risk is a variable that influences on leverage decisions and on 
the implementation of PPP projects by investors. The authors found that perceptions of 
political risk in those countries are high, with countries with higher political risk perceptions 
offering fewer PPP opportunities. Based on the research of Sachs and Tiong (2009), 
developing countries are those that, globally, report higher levels of investment risk, which 
makes it necessary to conduct studies on the management of these for this country group. As 
pointed out by Nobre, Carraro, Menezes Balbinotto, and Tillmann (2014) regarding Brazil: 
A caveat that must be made when comparing Brazil to other countries that have 
succeeded in the adoption of PPPs, such as Germany, Spain, Portugal and the UK, is 
that they have a stronger institutional backing to such partnerships. That is, 
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institutions and government are more consolidated, making it easier to achieve 
economic efficiency, and there is also a wider range of instruments available in order 
to induce transparency to the actions performed. (p. 2) 
Finally, when PPP comes to Colombia, Vieira (2011) noted that the country is well- 
positioned, it comes to economic forecasts “but it is not in aspects such as violence from 
armed groups and corruption, which lead to bad notes in security and transparency on public 
expenditures at international indicators” (p. 8, free translation from the original Spanish 
languaje). 
Additionally, as mentioned by Vargas (2011) in Colombia: 
...in the same national space, there is the coexistence of territories with ample official 
regulation and «empty territories», in the sense of lack of a regulatory entity 
representing the general interest. In these spaces the order starts being regulated by 
private entities with coercive capacity (guerrillas, neo-paramilitaries, criminal bands, 
and militia). (p.119, free translation from the original in Spanish 
Complementing, the legal and administrative processes through which investors must 
go through in order to carry on their projects, political concessions that might appear due to 
corruption and clientelism, translate into additional time before obtaining authorisations and 
licences “...the legal system ends up being slow, which greatly complicates conflict resolution 
with other companies, for both co-investment agreements and non-payment situations” 
(Oficina Económica y Comercial de la Embajada de España en Bogotá, 2012, p. 18, free 
translation from the original in Spanish. 
When adopting the political risk characterization of Sachs et al. (2007) it becomes 
relevant to measure the incidence of it on a subnational and disaggregated manner, for 
investments performed through PPPs in Colombia. The former, is justified as the tool 
internationally used for risk measurement is the country risk measure; however, at least for 
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the Colombian case, risk levels show differences depending on the region or municipality 
where the investment is going to be performed. An example of this was mentioned by Vargas 
(2011) who stated that violence in Colombia is different and its intensity level varies 
according to the region, since the State presence is greater in some urban centres than in other 
areas of the territory that have remained ignored for decades 
For this reason, the country risk indicator would not be sufficient to guide investors in 
a nation as contrasted as Colombia. This way, it must be noted that the current research aims 
to analyse deeply the subnational levels in relation to political risk and its effects on the 
success or failure of a PPP. 
Statement of the Problem 
At a global scale, PPPs have become an opportunity to increase efficiency, and reduce 
the burden for the public sector budget, targeting to increase development levels in countries. 
Ergo, such alliances have been especially adopted in developing countries (Jamali, 2004; 
Ménard, 2012; Moszoro, 2010, 2011). Complementing, Nijkamp, Van der Burch, and 
Vindigni (2002) and Spackman (2002) stated that the attractiveness of PPP can be explained 
in terms of expected benefits, better access to private banking, obtaining clear goals, 
innovative ideas, flexibility, proper planning, and a substantial increase in value creation 
from projects to be undertaken. For these reasons, PPPs are constituted as projects in which 
private investment plays an important role. 
Given their limitations in available funding and their need for infrastructure (Akitoby 
et al., 2007), developing countries and transition economies are prime candidates for PPPs. 
This not only means an increase in economic growth and the influx of capital into these 
countries, but also the responsibility and the need to learn about the levels of political risk 
(for the sake of this research) private parties are exposed to when investing in these nations. 
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In addition to the above, the importance of applying a methodology, in such a way, it is 
possible to measure the political risk on a subnational, disaggregated way must be 
considered, since this risk does not appear uniformly in a national territory. 
It must be added that corruption and inefficiency rates on service delivery to the 
civilian society by the bureaucratic apparatus are presented on a different manner in 
Colombia (Transparencia por Colombia, 2009). While the risk is high in overall terms, the 
most affected regions by these administrative issues are the peripheral ones; in contrast, the 
most developed ones in the country are the regions with lower levels of corruption and 
administrative inefficiency. This does not mean it is low, just less than in the most alarming 
cases as the Pacific and Orinoquia regions (Transparencia por Colombia, 2009). 
The previous discussion shows that the levels of political risk in the country may vary 
depending on the region and the municipality or a subnational part of a country. The main 
problem that this research addressed was the existing methodological gap for measuring 
investment risk in developing countries and in subregions within countries, where not 
possessing accurate information might lead investors to bet on investments with high rates of 
risk, which might end up affecting the profitability of investors.  
Given the above, it must be mentioned that despite the existence, contribution, and 
utility coming from multiple studies and methodologies to measure the mentioned risks, these 
indicators do not allow the obtention of disaggregate risk estimations in the regions or 
municipalities of a country. This way, it is difficult to determine the proportion of real risk for 
a specific investment or PPP. Therefore, it is necessary to complement the methodologies 
measuring risk in a general way, by proposing a disaggregate measure of the political risk.  
Purpose of the Study 
The current study sought to associate subnational perceptions from the selected 
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sample of public officers and private related to projects on political risk, encompassing six 
different types of risk and four different critical success factors, with the probability of 
success or failure of a particular type of PPPs, road infrastructure concessions. The types of 
political risk included in the study, following the study of Sachs et al. (2007), were: (a) 
currency inconvertibility, (b) breach of contract, (c) expropriation, (d) political violence, (e) 
legal and bureaucratic risk, and (f) non-governmental actions. For the purposes of the current 
study, four of the five critical success factors found by Hardcastle et al. (2005) were 
employed. These are: (a) effective procurement, which encompasses transparency, 
competitive processes, good governance and strong public institutions; (b) government 
guarantee, (c) favourable economic conditions and (d) available financial markets. 
The importance of knowing if there is any influence of political risk on the success or 
failure of a PPP at the subnational level comes from an increasing presence of PPPs in 
developing countries, whose political situations are not the same as in developed countries 
(AON, 2014; Marsh & McLennan Companies, 2013). From the data used in this research we 
seek to prove, that developing countries needs to work with those PRF and CSF in PPP  
projects. Based on the results related to the influence that the factors associated with political 
risk and critical success factors have on the success of a concession in infrastructure, this 
research intended to conclude on the influence these factors have on PPPs. 
The research measured subnational political risk on a disaggregated basis, as political 
risk is not presented uniformly in the territory within a country, while variables such as 
country risk factors do not employ subnational offsets. Because of this, the incidence of this 
type of risk in a municipality, department or region can be overlooked when assessing the 
viability and profitability of road infrastructure PPP projects, thus leading to the improper 
decision-making process for the completion and implementation of PPP projects. 
Significance of the Problem 
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It has been found that private funding for infrastructure projects enables the successful 
realization of these investments while boosting the development of countries (Jamali, 2004). 
In turn, the viability and profitability of PPPs may be affected negatively if investors have no 
real information on the risks of these projects (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009b). Thus, 
proper assessment of risks becomes paramount in these projects, especially political risk.  
An example of the above was displayed by Sachs et al. (2007), who focused on 
variables such as political risk and its six components, which allowed these authors to 
measure the investment risk on PPPs that emanates from political risk in China and other 13 
Asian countries. In turn, there are guidelines on political risk for infrastructure projects, with 
a special emphasis on the definition laid out by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA, 1985).  
However, the study of Sachs et al. (2007) did not allow for a disaggregated 
measurement of risk at a subnational level in these nations. This generates a methodological 
gap that may have important implications for the government and private investors interested 
in embarking on PPP alliances since the levels of political risk might experience great 
variations within a given country. This flaw can also be seen in other studies, thus leading to 
potential underestimation of political risk originating from subnational factors. This can be 
directly translated into a condition affecting both the benefits of private investors, as well as 
the effectiveness of the State when it comes to PPPs (Akitoby et al., 2007). 
  Therefore, the current research contributed to knowledge dealing with the incidence 
of political risk at the subnational level on the success or failure of PPP infrastructure 
projects, by closing key theoretical gaps that otherwise kept investors believing that all the 
risks that faced were at the national level; specifically, the assumption that political risk held 
a constant incidence throughout the subnational divisions of a given country, despite 
differences in culture, size, population, State presence, and economic situation.  This is a 
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contribution of importance to academia and for public and private investors interested in 
conducting this kind of projects around the world.  
Finally, the academic contribution of the study arises from the need to consider the 
realities of developing countries and economies in transition where political risk is higher 
when compared to developed countries (Oxford Economics, 2017). These results will help 
researchers in other parts of the world to carry out similar research to validate these findings 
and to broaden the understanding of the incidence of political risks at the subnational level in 
the success or failure of PPPs. Furthermore, it was intended to enrich the possibilities for PPP 
projects in developing countries to understand and manage the factors associated to political 
risk on their success. With this, it is expected to obtain a contribution for both the academy 
and investors interested in the execution of PPP projects in developing countries, through a 
better identification of the variables affecting infrastructure projects in Colombia. It is 
believed that this will lead to better decision-making processes that guarantee the success of 
these projects. 
Nature of the Study 
The current research had a quantitative approach, as it sought to obtain information 
about the most relevant factors to analyse the political risk on a PPP concession project at a 
subnational level, and their impact on the success or failure of such projects. Likewise, it was 
intended to analyse the role of these risk factors on a PPP project, seeking to confirm whether 
these factors should be taken into account by the parties in PPP infrastructure projects under 
this restriction. For this, structural equation modelling involving political risk factors, critical 
success factors and the existence of infrastructure projects as a success proxy was applied, 
backed by data collection from both primary and secondary sources. 
This research adopted an objectivist philosophical approach, which states that “things 
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exist as meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experience” (Crotty, 1998, p. 
5). According to Crotty (1998), objectivism is associated with positivism, and thus with 
quantifiable data and the application of statistical analysis in research in the real world. In 
turn, the current study used an explanatory approach, and a non-experimental design, in 
which the current conditions of a phenomenon (political risk-success factors) were detailed 
by using primary and secondary data, from multiple sources and subjects (Carroll, 2013).  
The explanatory scope originates from the need to prove the impact of political risk at 
a subnational level on the success or failure of a PPP on infrastructure projects, measured 
from its critical success and political risk factors, seeking significant relationships. In turn, 
the non-experimental design was selected as the data used for the analysis was gathered from 
primary and secondary sources without the need for any manipulation, to match the situations 
and results found in practice for infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships. 
This is accompanied by the use of quantitative methods to analyse the relationship, such as 
structural equation modelling. 
Parting from the epistemology, a set of rules known as the alpha-beta method 
(Figueroa, 2016) was adopted to defined the propositions obtained from the theory, from 
which the research questions were obtained. Such set was originally created for analysing 
economic theory, but its foundations and steps serve to develop the current study as well. 
Alpha proposition is defined as those unobservable variables that form the 
assumptions forming the foundations of a theory (Figueroa, 2016). As the current study 
adopted the agency theory, and public policy and risk theories, expanded upon in the 
theoretical framework, it could be said that an alpha proposition would originate from these. 
Namely, that agents involved in public-private partnerships seek to minimise and mitigate the 
risks originating from the actions of other agents, these being the State, civilians, special 
groups or illegal parties, among others when developing their PPP infrastructure projects, as 
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they are looking for success and profits from these. For this, identifying the dangers and the 
factors that lead to success is key. Also, another assumption lies in that agents perceive some 
regions as more riskier for business than others, due to factors such as violence, corruption 
and civil protests. 
Beta propositions, defined as those observable propositions employed to empirically 
prove a theory (Figueroa, 2016), serve to link said assumptions to reality, as well as 
measuring them. From the aforementioned assumptions and theories serving as alpha, the 
research questions would serve as their respective betas, designed to measure and test if the 
aforementioned assumptions hold after performing a study on the subject. The relationship 
between these is laid out in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Alpha-beta relationships between assumptions and research questions 
Research Questions 
The research questions used for this study went as follows: 
1. Are political risk factors at the subnational level related to both critical success factors 
for road infrastructure concession projects and the success of these? 
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2. Are there subnational differences on the influence of political risk factors on the 
success or failure of a road infrastructure concession project developed through a 
public-private partnership? 
Hypotheses 
Based on these questions and supported by the literature it is possible to establish the 
hypotheses of this research. The hypotheses studied throughout the current research were: 
H1a. PRF at the subnational level have a direct, significant relationship with CSF for 
road infrastructure concession projects. 
H1b. CSF for road infrastructure road concession projects have a direct, significant 
relationship with the success of these projects. 
H1c. PRF at the subnational level have an indirect, significant relationship with the 
success of road infrastructure concession projects. 
 
H2. There are significant subnational differences in the influence of PRF on the 
success or failure of a road infrastructure concession project developed through a 
PPP. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework employed for the current research made use of three 
theories: public policy theory (Laswell, 1996, as cited in Valencia & Álvarez, 2008; Ejea, 
2006; Jann & Wegrich, 2007; John, 2013), agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Castaño, 1999; Braendle, 2008), and risk theory (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; MIGA, 1985; 
Miller, 1992; Hardcastle, Edwards, Akintoye, & Li, 2005). All these theories were defined as 
crucial for the development of the study.  
Public policy theory comes first. Studies on public policy (also known as policy 
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science) were initially developed in the post-war United States and were pioneered by the 
work of Lasswell (1996, as cited in Valencia & Álvarez, 2008). Through the establishment of 
a policy science, Lasswell sought “to improve organisational performance and State 
government action” (Valencia & Álvarez, 2008, p. 95, free translation from the original in 
Spanish. Particularly, studies on public policies take the results and changes in public policies 
as dependent variables. That means that these variables seek to explain why a government 
chooses to implement a particular policy and why it chooses to modify existing policies 
(John, 2013). According to Ejea (2006), “the focus of Public Policies shows a technical-
scientific and political rationality that aims to determine public character problems and find 
them the best feasible solutions” (p. 3, free translation from the original in Spanish. 
 The most important model on the study of public policy is called the theory of the 
policy cycle (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). As indicated by Jann and Wegrich (2007), “from its 
origins in the 1950s, the field of policy analysis has been tightly connected with a perspective 
that considers the policy process as evolving through a sequence of discrete stages or phases” 
(p. 43). Based on this, the following stages can be identified in the process of implementing a 
public policy: agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation and 
evaluation (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). The association between the decision-making processes 
in public policies as a multi-staged one does not seek to assume a chronological order in 
these: 
The cycle perspective emphasizes feedback (loop) processes between outputs and 
inputs of policy-making, leading to the continual perpetuation of the policy processes. 
Outputs of policy processes at t1 have an impact on the wider society and will be 
transformed into an input (demands and support) to a succeeding policy process at t2. 
(Jann & Wegrich, 2007, p. 44) 
John (2013) identified two periods in the study of public policies: classical and 
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synthetic. In the classical period, the key terms were defined and the following models for the 
decision making processes were developed: (a) incrementalist, (b) rationalist, (c) elitist, (d) 
interactionist, (e) systemic, and (e) institutionalist (Valencia & Álvarez, 2008). In the 
synthetic period, more complex models were developed among which it is possible to find: 
policy advocacy coalition framework, policy streams and windows, punctuated equilibrium 
and comparative political economy (John, 2013).  
The current work took the incrementalist model, which understands that the definition 
of new public policies is conditioned by the existing ones and takes into account that changes 
are delivered gradually and not in at once. This means that “new policies (only) modify, 
change or supplement older policies, or – more likely – compete with them or contradict each 
other” (Fischer & Miller, 2006, p. 45). 
 A second model that was taken into account was that of policy advocacy coalition 
framework (John, 2013), which takes the idea developed by the school of political networks 
when considering that relationships between political sectors are relevant at the moment of 
studying the decision- making process (John, 2013). This, in turn, identifies the decision- 
making process as a continuum, that is, it is not possible to accurately identify a beginning 
and an end (John, 2013). 
 Meanwhile, Ejea (2006) pointed out that an additional public policy model is the new 
public management model that surged from the 80s with the dominance of the neoclassical 
current advocating a lower State presence.  
The new public management consists of two elements: 
One is the elimination of the dichotomy between administration and politics, or rather, 
the review from multiple angles that politics does matter in government performance. 
The other is the recognition of the participation of non-state actors in the delivery of 




 New public management follows these values: “productivity, merchandising, service 
attitude, decentralization, public policy orientation and accountability; and the key factors for 
its development include: non-state provision means, decentralization and new forms of 
coordination” (Ejea, 2006, p 14, free translation from the original in Spanish. This was the 
third theory of public policy used in this study. 
Next, agency theory gained relevance in the 20th century (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship is defined as: 
...a contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the 
best interests of the principal. (p. 5) 
Similarly, Castaño (1999) stated that the agency relationship is created when a 
principal delegates rights on an agent, the above under a contract that requires the agent to 
protect the interests of the former. Therefore, such theory is a contribution for the analysis of 
levels of hierarchy and exchange situations, seeking to understand the behaviours of agents 
and the conflicting relationship between these and the principal (Peris-Ortiz, Rueda, De 
Souza, & Pérez, 2012). 
The aforementioned leads to what is known as agency costs, which according to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are classified into three types: 
1. The monitoring expenditures by the principal. 
2. The bonding expenditures by the agent. 
3. The residual loss. (p. 308). 
Two additional problems considered to be transversal to agency relationships appear from 
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said costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioned adverse selection and moral hazard as 
negative variables within organisations. The first one is created because of information 
asymmetries. Braendle (2008) said that: 
Adverse selection describes an agency problem where asymmetric information exists 
before the transaction occurs, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
Originally the term adverse selection came from the insurance industry. It describes a 
situation of private information where the insured are more likely to suffer a loss than 
the uninsured. (p. 10) 
Meanwhile, according to Braendle (2008), “Compared to adverse selection, moral 
hazard describes an agency problem which exists after a transaction is made, leading to an 
inefficient allocation of resources. The term moral hazard, as well, has its origin in the 
insurance industry” (p. 10). 
So, the correction of these problems is proposed from the standpoint of agency theory, 
by employing incentive policies, improving institutions and designing the organization in a 
way information asymmetries between departments, in the market and between the principal 
agent relationships are avoided. Therefore, agency theory allows an understanding of the 
organisation and the exchanges between the stakeholders around it, taking the idea of 
individual rationality and the different interests of stakeholders as a starting point. 
The aforementioned gains relevance when studying PPPs, as these are formed as 
contracts in which both the private and public sectors have specific goals for the project to be 
developed, however, these goals are asymmetrical most of the times. Private participants seek 
to obtain a return on their investment, while in addition to the economic sustainability of the 
project, the public sector considers political and social implications that led to the 
development of these works (Akitoby et al., 2007). Thus the institutional correction proposed 
by the agency theory helps in controlling the parties and their selfish interests at the moment 
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of conducting a PPP. 
Finally, it is important to review risk theory, as when it comes to risk, “…we are not 
able in life to avoid risk but only to choose between risks” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981, p. 11). 
Risk has multiple definitions in the literature. From the quantitative point of view, and 
analysing the case of investment portfolios, Huang (2008) mentioned the existence of three 
widely used definitions: (a) the variance of the portfolio; (b) the semi-variance of the 
portfolio, which only takes into account the values under the mean for calculating the 
variance; and (c) the probability of an adverse outcome. 
Given the inevitability of these, an adequate risk management has gained major 
importance in recent times, preceded by the proper identification of these (Nocco & Stulz, 
2006). Through the above, it is possible for a company to perform a better design in their 
strategic plans, by enabling to decide in an adequate fashion which risks are worth taking for 
the development of these projects, and how to cover them. 
Miller (1992) proposed an integral framework for risk management and identification, 
mentioning how this approach appears to be more convenient for companies compared with 
an individual risk analysis, given the possibility to design integral strategies for handling 
them. Furthermore, the author mentioned two types of risk constantly considered by 
companies, and around which these design their mitigation strategies: (a) financial risk, 
associated to the likelihood of negative financial performance; and (b) strategic risk, 
associated to decision making processes. 
On infrastructure projects, and more specifically PPPs, Li (2003) stated the existence 
of a set of associated risk variables. On the one hand, he said that macro risks can be found, 
which are associated with the general environment in which the project is carried out. It is 
possible to observe within this type of risk: (a) political risk, generated by unstable 
governments, expropriation and nationalization, and corruption; (b) macroeconomic risk, 
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linked to poor financial markets, changes in inflation, interest rates and exchange rates, and 
economic events; (c) legal risk associated with changes in law, currency, tax and industry 
regulation; (d) social risk, defined by public opposition, social corruption and lack of order in 
society; and (e) natural hazard, determined by events of force majeure, geographical 
conditions, climate and environment. 
In turn, Li (2003) also stated that meso risks could also be found, which affect a 
particular project. Among these, it is possible to find: (a) project selection, (b) project 
financing, (c) residual risk, (d) design, (e) construction and operation. Finally, micro risk can 
be found, associated with the interaction between the parties involved in the project. These 
may appear in the following ways: (a) relationship, associated with the coordination and 
cooperation between the involved parties, (b) third parties, risks associated with actions of 
third parties not involved in the project. 
Finally, on the more specific case of political risk, the risk classification created by 
MIGA (1985) can be found, comprising six types of political risk: (a) governmental 
restrictions for convertibility and money transfer overseas, (b) expropriation, (c) breach of 
contract, (d) political violence, (e) legal and bureaucratic risk, and (f) non-governmental 
action risk. This classification gains a special relevance for the current work given the focus 
placed on political risk throughout the current study. Depending on this identification, it is 
possible to design mitigation strategies that help to ensure the success of these projects. 
Therefore, risk theory is relevant to the two research questions, thus making it the main 
theory for the current study. 
With respect to PPPs, it should be noted there are several types, which depend on 
their purposes, and their legal and administrative environment (Jamali, 2004). Some of the 
identified PPP types, named after the tasks delegated to the private sector under each 
arrangement, are: (a) Build-Own-Operate (BOO), (b) Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), (c) 
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Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), and (d) Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF) 
(Alshawi, 2009). For example, in a PPP of the BOO type, the private party is in charge of 
building, owning and operating the asset throughout the duration of the agreement. 
Now, from the Colombian legislation, PPPs can be understood as: 
Public Private Partnerships are an instrument to involve private capital, materialised 
in a contract between a governmental entity and a natural or judicial person from the 
private law, in order to supply public goods and its related services, involving risk 
retention and transfer between the parts and payment methods, related to the 
availability and service level of the infrastructure and/or service. (Ley 1508, 2012, p. 
1, free translation from the original in Spanish) 
The distinction between PPPs and traditional procurement is given by the fact that the 
multiple stages (design, construction, maintenance, operation) are defined by separate 
contracts where a single contract exists in PPPs. In turn, the public sector bears the risks in 
traditional procurement, while the risks are shared in PPPs (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010). 
Meanwhile, the distinction between PPPs and privatisation is given by the fact that public 
responsibilities and liability on risks are transferred to the private sector in a privatisation. 
While public accountability remains in hands of the public sector in PPPs (Evenhuis & 
Vickerman, 2010). Also, a PPP is temporary (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). 
As Kwak, Chih, and Ibbs (2009) showed, multiple studies around the world were 
conducted in order to characterise the critical success factors behind a PPP project. For the 
purposes of the current study, four of the five critical success factors found by Hardcastle et 
al. (2005) were employed. These are: (a) effective procurement, which encompasses 
transparency, competitive processes, good governance and strong public institutions; (b) 
government guarantee, (c) favourable economic conditions and (d) available financial 
markets. The fifth factor, project implementability, which encompassed legal framework, 
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technical feasibility, risk allocations, commitment by the parties and a strong private partner, 
was excluded. 
In turn, the definition of political risk exposed by Sachs et al. (2007), originating from 
the one delivered by MIGA (1985), leads to six categories of political risk, as follows: 
1. Risk associated with governmental restrictions for convertibility and money transfer 
overseas. 
2. Expropriation risk, which impedes private investment. 
3. Breach of contract risk, where the private agent does not have an adequate and competent 
legal instance to defend itself in front of a breach of contract by the State. 
4. Political violence, associated to acts of war, civil war, insurrection or civil disobedience, 
terrorism, sabotage or disturbances caused by indigenous people and landlords. 
5. Legal and bureaucratic risk, which is associated to governmental administrative processes, 
including law execution and enforcement, conflicts of authority, corruption, 
transparency, problems to obtain approvals and consents, alterations because of 
government changes, and obstruction during arbitration. 
6. Non-governmental action risk, involving the ones over which the government has no direct 
influence, and do not belong to the former categories, such as union and 
environmental activism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic tension, foreign 
intervention and risks at the currency market. 
On the selection of these factors, MIGA currently offers political risk insurance based 
on a narrow definition laid out throughout the insurance industry, involving (a) currency 
inconvertibility and transfer, (b) expropriation, (c), political violence, (d) breach of contract, 
and (e) non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations (MIGA, 2013).  
However, such definition is known to be limited by MIGA itself: a survey they 
deployed together with The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) showed how corruption and 
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adverse regulatory changes, factors associated to legal and bureaucratic risk, ranked highly 
among the worries of investors in developing countries (MIGA, 2013). The former, combined 
with the use in literature of the definition laid out in the current study (Sachs, 2007; Sachs & 
Tiong, 2007), led to adopting the definition laid out by MIGA (1985) instead of the political 
risk insurance categories offered by MIGA (2013) at present. 
Definition of Terms 
Public-private partnerships (PPP): “a long-term contract between a private party and a 
government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears 
significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance” 
(World Bank, 2017b, p.1).  
Concession: according to OECD (2014), a concession is put in place when “a private 
entity takes over the management of a state-owned enterprise for a given period during which 
it also assumes significant investment risk” (p. 12). Following on the above, the PPPIRC 
(2016a) mentioned that the State remains the owner of the assets, and that asset reversion 
occurs at the end of the concession period. Finally, it shows concessions as a particular type 
of PPP arrangement (PPPIRC, 2016b), among many others. 
According to the World Bank (2017b), concessions within the context of PPPs are 
defined as a type of contract for new or existing infrastructure, usually delegating design, 
rehabilitation, extension or building, financing, maintenance and operation of services offered 
to users, in which these users pay for the cost of these services directly. However, this 
definition varies according to the national legislation, as well as its delimitation. 
Critical success factors: for the current study, the classification of Hardcastle et al. 
(2005) was used, according to which the main critical success factors for infrastructure 
projects were (a) favourable economic conditions, (b) available financial markets, (c) 
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effective procurement, (d) government guarantee and (e) project implementability. Regarding 
the meaning of critical success factors, Rockart (1982) defined as “those few key areas of 
activity in which favourable results are absolutely necessary for a particular manager to reach 
his or her own goals” (p. 4). This definition has seen widespread adoption in management, 
with Hardcastle et al. (2005) mentioning how it has been implemented in management studies 
on financial services, information systems and manufacturing. 
Risk: it was defined by Vlek and Stallen (as cited in Li, 2003) as “the complete 
description of undesired consequences of a course of action, together with an indication of 
their likelihood and seriousness” (p. 83). Likewise, Edwards and Bowen (as cited in Li, 2003) 
associated it to “probability that an adverse event occurs during a stated period time” (p. 84).  
Region: formal national subdivisions, as well as informal national subdivisions based 
on factors such as culture and geographic features.  
Subnational income per capita: incomes corresponding to each formal national 
subdivision, in this case the departments. 
“Subnational”: this term refers to subnational entities, which are levels of government 
created for administrative purposes within a country. In the Colombian case, it involves the 
levels of government created by the political-administrative division of the Colombian 
territory, for administrative and political representation purposes: (a) departments, (b) 
districts, (c) municipalities and (d) indigenous territories (DANE, 2007). Each of these levels 
has its own, limited set of subnational legislative acts that complement or contradict national 
dispositions on infrastructure PPP projects, such as ordinances issued by departments, council 
agreements in municipalities and districts, and previous consultations with indigenous 




The idea on which this study is based is that PPPs have become important as a means 
to complement national government investments in achieving national development, and in 
promoting large-scale, high-investment projects with high social impact. As exposed by 
Spackman (2002) PPPs can provide benefits for the realization of a particular public 
investment project, since the fusion between private administrative experience and funding 
and the support and delegation of responsibility from the part of the public sector becomes a 
large value generator for society in general.  
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that another assumption taken as a starting point, is 
that developing countries and transition economies have become attractive economies for the 
global private investment of government projects (Vieira, 2011), which has multiple effects: 
(a) an increase in the number of PPP projects at these countries, (b) an increase in foreign 
capital inflows to these countries, and (c) a greater need for verification of the risk factors 
associated to the execution of investment projects. Therefore, the assumptions forming the 
foundations of a theory (Figueroa, 2016). As the current study adopted the agency theory, and 
public policy and risk theories, expanded upon in the theoretical framework. Those studies 
aiming to deepen the subject are relevant, with these taking into account the real 
characteristics of the contexts to which they apply. 
On the other hand, and for the purposes of this research, political risk was understood 
as that included in the characterization created by Sachs et al. (2007), which was explained 
earlier. Also, that characterization starts from the idea that political risk has negative effects 
on investment projects through PPPs. Therefore, it departs from the idea that the different 
factors affecting the measurement of political risk - as defined by Sachs et al. (2007) - do not 
occur uniformly throughout a nation. As proof of this, it is possible to observe the rates of 
political violence and legal – bureaucratic risk in Colombia, and in other large countries, such 
as Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Perú, for which it is relevant that the risk is measured on a 
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disaggregated basis, so as to reflect that reality in the assessment of political risks in the 
success or failure of a PPP project. 
It must be mentioned that a set of variables that also matter when executing an 
investment were omitted, such as economic stability of the country, labour regime, taxation 
stability, the level of project information or data, among others. The risks associated to these 
variables were also excluded, due to the focus being put on political risk factors, despite their 
relevance at the moment of evaluating infrastructure projects. 
The last assumption that was made is that political risk factors at the subnational and 
national levels may vary, and these subnational risk factors are as important as national ones 
when it comes to defining the success or failure of a PPP in an infrastructure concession 
project. Now, information delivered by those Colombian public agencies, responsible for  
national statistics, was used on the factors affecting the measurement of political risk, as well 
as that of other research centres possessing relevant information. 
Limitations 
Throughout the development of the current research, there were issues related to 
availability and response rates from mayoral and gubernatorial offices in the country, despite 
using the “right to petition” legal figure to obtain a response regarding political risk 
perceptions. Thus, despite sending surveys and contacting all Colombian municipalities and 
governorships, response rates were much lower, from less than 10% of these. 
Also, there were concerns regarding the response quality, as it was not possible to 
control the effects that factors such as political bias, knowledge of the subject or time could 
have on these answers, even though the questionnaire included some guidelines on expected 
response times and the basic concepts underlying the survey. In turn, lack of more specific 
project-level information meant that project implementability, one of the five critical success 
30 
 
factors laid out by Hardcastle et al. (2005), could not be included in the current study. I read 
about that subject in mention but the information on that topic was limited. 
In turn, there were issues on the availability of secondary data; specifically, 
outstanding credit portfolio information was obtained for overall per capita credit instead of 
focusing on business credit, due to data limitations. Finally, there was uncertainty on the 
distribution of the data to be gathered from the surveys, as well as on the data coming from 
secondary databases, due to lack of knowledge on the structure of the population. 
Delimitations 
This research centred on the analysis of political risk factors, on the implementation of 
PPPs for roads infrastructure in Colombia through concessions. Thus, the study aimed to 
determine the role of political risk factors on the success or failure of investments made 
through PPP in such projects. However, said variable was measured at the subnational level 
because, from a general perspective, there is a risk of not exposing errors at the time of 
assessing the feasibility of a PPP. So, this study argued that the political risk factors possess a 
fragmented logic in the subnational level, which shape flashpoints regions where the risk is 
higher than in cities or other regions with greater control by the government. 
The classification used for the Colombian regions followed a classification through 
which departments, the largest national administrative subdivisions, are grouped into 
socioeconomic  regions, as follows (Colombia.com, 2017): Andean, Caribbean, 
Pacific, Orinoquia, and Amazon. The number of municipalities per region was calculated by 
adding the municipalities of each department, obtained from DANE (2013). In turn, these 




Figure 3. Colombian administrative regions. Adapted from Colombia.com (2017) 
Table 1 Departments per Region 
Departments per Region 
Region Municipalities Departments Colour in 
Figure 2 
Andean 629 Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Huila, 
Norte de Santander, Quindío, Risaralda, 
Santander, and Tolima, in addition to Distrito 
Capital (the capital district). 
Brown 
Caribbean 197 Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Córdoba, La Guajira, 
Magdalena, San Andrés y Providencia, and Sucre 
Orange 
Pacific 178 Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca Blue 
Orinoquia 59 Arauca, Casanare, Meta, and Vichada Yellow 
Amazon 59 Amazonas, Caquetá, Guainía, Guaviare, 
Putumayo and Vaupés 
Green 
 
Only road infrastructure projects were taken for the current study. This is due to the 
importance of said projects in the developing country that was selected for the study, as there 
is currently a large-scale road infrastructure development program based around concessions 
and public-private partnerships. Thus, other types of infrastructure projects conducted 
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through PPP in the country were excluded from the study; such as PPP projects in electricity, 
airports, natural gas, ports, railways, treatment plants, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and water utilities (PPID, 2017). These are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Public-Private Partnerships per Sector in Colombia 
Public-Private Partnerships per Sector in Colombia 
Sector Type of public-private partnership Count 
Airports Build, operate, and transfer 1 
 Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 5 
 Lease contract 2 
 Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 1 
Electricity Build, lease, and transfer 1 
 Build, operate, and transfer 5 
 Build, own, and operate 7 
 Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 1 
 Full 4 
 Merchant 4 
 Partial 8 
 Build, own, and operate 1 
 Merchant 6 
 Partial 2 
Information and communication 
technologies 
Build, own, and operate 1 
Merchant 6 
Partial 2 
Natural gas Build, operate, and transfer 4 
 Build, own, and operate 4 
 Full 2 




Sector Type of public-private partnership Count 
Ports Build, operate, and transfer 5 
 Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 1 
 Merchant 1 
 Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer 1 
 Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 5 
Railways Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 2 
Roads Build, operate, and transfer 6 
 Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 42 
 Management contract 1 
 Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 9 
Treatment plants Build, operate, and transfer 1 
 Build, own, and operate 1 
 Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 1 
Water utilities Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 15 
 Lease contract 15 
 Management contract 7 
 Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer 3 
 Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 9 
Total            193 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: custom query at the PPID (2017) website. 
Likewise, only road infrastructure projects given in concession, as shown in Table 2, 
were included. For the purposes of the current study, that meant that only projects supervised 
or allocated by Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI) were taken into account, thus 
excluding those roads managed directly by the State, through Instituto Nacional de Vías 
(INVÍAS). In turn, only the municipalities where tolls were located counted as municipalities 
with road concessions, due to data constraints. 
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Finally, the current study was bounded by the rationality and knowledge of survey 
respondents. The former must be mentioned since, as questionnaires were sent to all 
municipalities, there was no way to ensure the person in charge of responding these was the 
one responsible for infrastructure projects or at least knowledgeable on these. This result 
could lead to unexpected outcomes when applying quantitative analysis techniques on these 
results. 
Summary 
PPPs have become one of the main methods for the development of infrastructure 
projects around the world, since they allow obtaining lower borrowing costs, adequate levels 
of security, and the ability to combine the public sector planning capabilities with the private 
sector efficiency, availability of capital, and experience. These associations have been utilised 
for different investment projects ranging from roads to hospitals, in both developed and 
emerging nations (Akitoby et al., 2007). 
However, PPPs are facing a number of risks associated with political, operational, 
social, financial, and market factors. It is worth mentioning, that the political risk is 
particularly relevant in developing countries (Sachs et al., 2007). However, private capital is 
looking at these as an important attraction, which in turn requires an analysis on the risks 
faced by investors by their desire to participate on PPPs in these nations. 
In the specific case of Colombia, the political risk is still pretty high. This is caused by 
the national reality, which is permeated by war, corruption and retardant processes of an old-
fashioned bureaucracy, among others (Ortiz, 2012; Transparencia por Colombia, 2009; 
Vargas, 2011), therefore, the need to determine the contrasts on political risk among the 
various regions and municipalities of the country. 
The former can be justified by putting in evidence that none of the methodologies for 
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risk analysis on investment perform a subnational adjustment of the problem, which can 
provide mismatched information at the time of project valuation. Ergo, it is important to 
know the real situation of the aforementioned phenomena, which leads to analyse the impact 
of these variables on PPP projects in a subnational and disaggregated setting. 
This way, the current study analyses quantitative variables at different levels, in order 
to obtain a wider comprehension of the political risk, in Colombia. Thereby, a literature 
review was carried out throughout the next chapter, seeking to widen the horizons for the 
subject to be treated from a theoretical point of view, as well as identifying the theoretical 




Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Historically, the State has been responsible for promoting the development of the 
countries, especially, regarding to: (a) civil works, (b) infrastructure, and (c) goods and 
services for the enjoyment of society as a whole (Akitoby et al., 2007). However, economic 
changes and the current context of globalization have created a fluctuating world where many 
economies, generally, those of developing countries and transition economies are struggling 
at the moment of financing high investment and social impact projects “for example, in India 
public investment slowed down as part of fiscal adjustment measures taken in response to the 
crisis suffered in the early nineties” (Akitoby et al., 2007, p. 2, free translation from the 
original in Spanish. 
In response to this situation, governments have found in PPPs an alternative for the 
crystallization of such projects, without having to contend with significant fiscal imbalances. 
…all the economies, rich and poor alike, must dedicate limited resources to satisfy 
opposing needs, procuring to strike a balance between the investment in physical and 
human capital -education, health and other social sectors- and guaranteeing there is 
enough income to cover current expenses at the same time. (Akitoby et al., 2007, p. 1, 
free translation from the original in Spanish 
In this sense, and considering that PPPs are positioned as partnerships between the 
public and private sectors, through which investment projects of high impact are carried out, 
it is worth mentioning the relevance of assessing the feasibility and profitability of any 
investment project, as well as the risks to be assumed by investors when deciding to invest, 
under the figure of PPP. Specially analysing and measuring the political risk and subnational 
levels and the factor for their success in a PPP.  
  Therefore, a review on a set of documents viewed as contributions for the current 
study was conducted, and the gaps on these documents were identified  in accordance to the 
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aforementioned purposes. Initially, the works conceptualising PPPs and showing the 
development of these in some countries were observed; later, the relevance of the public 
policy theory was reviewed, followed by one on risk methodologies, to finalise with a look 
on the Colombian political risk and the influence of security problems in the regions of the 
country. The structure of this section is displayed in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Structure of the review of the literature 
Documentation 
Regarding the process to find the authors mentioned throughout the review of the 
literature, these were found through Internet searches, using specialized search engines such 
as Google Scholar and Scopus, followed by using institutional access to databases such as 
Science Direct, JStor, Wiley, Emerald, Taylor & Francis and SciELO. Articles were 
considered regardless of the journal where these were originally published. Also, general 
search engine queries were conducted on the subjects treated during the review. A special 
mention must be made to institutional websites and databases, which were useful for both 
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theoretical definitions and data throughout the research. 
PPP Definitions 
It is possible to find multiple definitions for a PPP in the literature. Jamali (2004) 
mentioned PPPs are relations between actors of public and private character, performed in 
order to jointly provide some kind of service type. It must be noted, there is no unique PPP 
model, since these vary according to the legal status, the government, the management, the 
policy adjusting capabilities, the contributions and the operational roles. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2004) PPPs are a type of 
agreement or arrangement between the public and private sectors, in which the latter plays a 
role similar to that of the State; i.e., private capital becomes a supplier of public assets and 
services, especially, regarding economic and social infrastructure. Thus, based on what was 
mentioned by Moszoro (2010) this type of alliance has experienced a boom in recent decades 
because, from the point of view of governments, these agreements represent an efficient 
solution to meet the demand for public services. Meanwhile, conducting these projects may 
represent a multiplication of assets for private investors. 
Regarding financing, the IMF (2004) mentioned that the private sector owns greater 
potential to acquire funding than the public sector, as investors can easily borrow through the 
use of future income from the investment as collateral. It must be highlighted, that expected 
revenue in a PPP can come from two sources. The first one mentions the collection that 
originates from the users in general. The second, meanwhile, refers to amounts paid by the 
State, when it is the sole user of the works. 
Also, an important point emphasized by the IMF (2004) is the management of risk, 
even though it is distributed among the parties, mitigation of it must be real, the above in 
order to have an objective estimate of the benefits brought by the project. Therefore, it must 
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be mentioned that PPPs are projects with the ability to create value as a whole; however, 
should there not be proper coordination and measurement of all variables that affect the 
project, it is likely to fail. 
Later, Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2007) conceptualised PPPs as: 
There are several definitions for “Public-Private Partnership”. In this paper we take it 
to mean an infrastructure project such that (i) assets are controlled by a private firm 
for a (possibly infinite) term; (ii) during the duration of the contract, the firm is the 
residual claimant, while the government is the residual claimant at the end of the 
concession. However, these claims are ambiguous due to contract incompleteness; and 
(iii) there is considerable amount of public planning in the design of the project. We 
use the term “concession” as synonymous to PPP. (p. 1) 
In addition to the above, these same authors complemented the definition of PPP by 
identifying the projects on which these are generally focused. 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) increasingly substitute public provision, for a wide 
array of services and infrastructures that require large up-front investments, such as 
highways, water and sewerage, bridges, trains, sea and airports, jails, hospitals and 
schools. A typical PPP bundles investment and service provision into a single 
contract. (Engel et al., 2007, p. 1) 
The rise of these alliances has led to restructuring traditional public institutions 
dedicated to managing this kind of projects, hence the staff management and organization of 
departments is a role taken by the private management counterpart. Thus, public managers 
have been reduced to the supervision of contracts only (Girard et al., 2009). 
It must be remembered that the success in PPPs depends on the existence of “...stable 
legal and political environments” (Sachs et al., 2007, p. 127). This way, structuring a suitable 
framework in which both sectors integrate will result in the generation of value for all 
40 
 
stakeholders (Shediac, Abouchakra, Hammami, & Najjar, 2008).  
This way, PPPs are configured as a type of investment which allows (a) dividing, 
managing, and allocating risks in a better way; (b) obtaining lower implementation costs; (c) 
achieving higher levels of quality and efficiency; (d) gaining access to a lower cost of capital; 
(e) easing the transfer of administrative and management expertise from the private sector to 
the public sector; (f) obtaining greater industry-specific knowledge for the public sector to 
use; and (g) avoiding mistakes committed in the privatization process, for which these 
alliances became a third 'way' to leverage the strengths of both sectors (Engel et al., 2009a; 
Moszoro, 2010; Shediac et al., 2008). 
It is worth mentioning that PPPs differ from the traditional public provision of 
infrastructure services, in that the private firm managing traditional construction projects is 
not responsible for the performance in the long term since it is only concerned with 
complying during the warranty period to the construction, which is usually quite short. In 
contrast, PPPs define service provision and investment under a single long-term contract 
(Engel et al., 2009a). 
Likewise, it must be mentioned these alliances differentiate themselves from 
privatizations since public planning participation is observed through the process as a 
fundamental component: “...public planning is an important aspect of PPPs, plus the fact that 
contracts are periodically reassigned.” (Engel et al., 2009a, p. 3). 
Meanwhile, Alshawi (2009) stated there are multiple PPP types, the first of which is 
known as “build”, “own” and “operate” (BOO) PPPs, or classic PPP; in turn there are 
“build”, “own” and “transfer” (BOT) PPPs; “design”, “build”, “finance” and “operate” 
(DBFO) PPPs; and “design”, “build”, “manage”, and “finance” (DBMF) PPPs. In relation to 
the former, Engel et al. (2009a) stated that: 
There also exists a rich set of acronyms to describe specific PPP arrangements, 
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including BLT, BLTM, BOT, DBOT, DBFO, DBFO/M, JV and ROT. The B usually 
stands for build, the L for lease, the R for rehabilitate, the T for transfer, the O for 
operate, the D for design, the F for finance, and the M for manage. JV stands for 
“joint venture”. (p. 4) 
Therefore, these authors complemented the concept by stating that in the framework 
of these relationships, PPPs constitute a tool to build, manage and control projects. However, 
it is necessary for the contract to be clear and convenient for both parts since there might 
appear incongruences in the same otherwise (Engel et al., 2009a). 
On the other hand, Navarro and Hernández (2009) argued that PPPs are alliances 
between the State and the private business capital, originating from the budget constraints on 
the governments when delivering public services and goods. “Through PPP the government 
enters into a long-term contract with a private partner to deliver a good or service. The 
private partner is responsible for building, operating and maintaining assets that are necessary 
for delivering the good or service” (p. 1). Also, Athias (2011) conceptualised PPPs as 
contracts performed between the public and private sectors, through which projects are 
executed, especially in infrastructure, for which these are positioned as an alternative to the 
traditional models, in which financing and responsibility are assigned to the public sector. 
Kappeler and Nemoz (2010) characterised PPPs stating that: 
The relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation between the 
public partner and the private partner on different aspects of a planned project […]; 
The method of funding the project, in part from the private sector, sometimes by 
means of complex arrangements between the various players […]; The important role 
of the economic operator, who participates at different stages in the project (design, 
completion, implementation, funding) (…); The distribution of risks between the 
public partner and the private partner, to whom the risks generally borne by the public 
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sector are transferred […]. (p. 4) 
In turn, Oliveira and Cunha (2012) understood PPPs as arrangements or agreements 
between the government and private parties, created in order to provide infrastructure and 
public services, in areas such as: “Light rails, water systems, waste management, schools, 
sport centres, social housing, are just a few examples of sectors where the private sector is 
becoming more actively involved with local authorities” (p. 1). Also, according to Ménard 
(2012): 
Public-Private Partnership has been high on the agenda of public decision makers 
since the 1990’s. Primarily a contractual approach to the delivery of infrastructures, 
goods and services traditionally provided by the public sector or by private operators 
submitted to tight regulation, PPP is also a very special contractual practice as it seeks 
to introduce market-type relationships in a context in which non-market forces play a 
major role. (p. 2)  
Sharma (2012) mentioned that there’s been a rapid increase in the PPP project 
numbers around the world since the 90s. Meanwhile, Bonnafous and Faivre D’Arcier (2013) 
noted that the World Bank has been fomenting and observing an increase in the use of PPPs 
as a tool for infrastructure developments since 1990. Therefore, it is possible to mention that 
PPPs have been positioned as instruments for institutional and financial management, which 
hold the potential to close the development gap between countries. 
Even more so if taking into account that: 
PPPs may help governments provide infrastructure more efficiently. A common claim 
is that PPPs relieve budgetary restrictions and release public funds. A second 
argument is that because financing of the project is private, it is subject to the 
discipline of the financial market, which leads to important efficiency gains. A third 
argument is that PPPs can mimic a competitive market, since they are often 
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adjudicated in competitive auctions. Fourth, even though user fees can be charged 
under public provision and under PPPs, the fact that there is at least one interested 
party in setting profitable tolls under PPPs balances the political pressures to lower 
fees. Fifth, PPPs should help filter ‘white elephants’. Sixth, various arguments have 
been given to justify PPPs on distributional grounds. (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 
2011, pp. 7-8) 
Now, the Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia (2013) defined this 
association type as an efficient collaboration scheme between the public and private sectors, 
which allows financing and supplying public services and related services in the long term. 
Now with an understanding on the concept of PPP, it is convenient to look at this type 
of project from the contribution of the public policy theory, in order to evidence some 
representative cases in the execution of these contracts. 
Public Policy Theories and PPP 
As indicated by Orellana regarding PPPs (2012): 
The structure adopted by these forms of work between the public and private sectors 
during the 80s can be explained in part, by the changes suffered in the practice of 
public management, after incorporating elements of the new public management, 
mainly the figure of outsourcing for certain public functions. (p. 2, free translation 
from the original Spanish language) 
The new public management school had a great influence on the evolution and 
development of private participation in the provision of public goods through PPPs, given the 
conceptualizations of the relations between State and private sector developed. But the 
policies that were implemented based on the guidelines of the new public management relied 
on national contexts and outcomes. The latter was relevant to understand the origin of the 
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PPPs (Orellana, 2012). 
In Latin America, the guidelines of the new public management were reflected on the 
privatisation wave of the 90s. The latter did not deliver the expected results, which led this 
policy to gradually lose support from Latin American societies (Engel et al., 2003, 2009a). 
Given the need for private sector participation in the provision of public goods derived from 
the financial limits of the States, PPPs were seen as a “third way, promising the advantages of 
privatization while avoiding its pitfalls” (Engel et al. 2009a, p. 1). 
 Although public policy models provide relevant instruments for the study of these, in 
general, and in terms of PPPs, in particular, these approaches look restrictive when applied on 
Latin American reality, since these belong to theories created for developed countries 
(Osman, 2002). As stated by Osman (2002) “public policies in the developing countries 
possess certain peculiarities of their own by virtue of being influenced by an unstable socio-
political environment, and face various problems and challenges” (p. 37). 
The above is explained by the fact that Latin American countries, as developing 
countries, generally have higher levels of political risk than developed countries (AON, 2014; 
Marsh & McLennan Companies, 2013). Therefore, it is necessary to consider Latin American 
realities when applying theoretical models originating from the latter. Then, by studying the 
relationship between political risk and the success of road infrastructure concessions in 
Colombia, the current study sought to deliver elements that evidence the existing gap in 
public policy studies on developing countries in general. Evidence on the relationship that 
political risk has with the outcome of a particular policy was obtained, helping to select 
which factors should be taken into account for the definition and implementation of other 
public measures and, hence, for the theoretical public policy models. 
 
Risk at PPP Projects and its Measurement 
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 Recognising the importance of having a full knowledge of the risks associated with an 
investment in a PPP, Li (2003) made a classification (that included political risk) 
disaggregated by level of analysis. At the macro level, the author identified those risks 
associated with the overall environment of a PPP project. At the meso level, the risks 
associated with the PPP project in particular. Finally, at the micro level, the author focused on 
the risks associated with the relationships between the parties involved in a PPP project. 
Also, Engel et al. (2009a) enumerated the risks to which these investment types are 
exposed, namely: (a) demand risk, caused by unreliable forecasts, which are exposed to 
alterations in micro and macroeconomic indicators, as well as uncertainty on the price-
elasticity of demand; (b) operation and construction risk, which is provoked because 
projected operation and maintenance risks tend to differ from the real ones; and (c) political 
risk, which is linked to specific and non-specific governmental actions, altering the obtained 
results. Such, it is pertinent for companies making these association types to make previous 
analysis regarding risk management and mitigation. 
 For that reason, these authors argued that PPPs do not always get the desired results. 
In this way, they described the experience in road concessions assigned to private operators 
during the nineties in four Latin American countries, in which a common pattern of overruns 
caused by flaws in the design of contracts, and unrealistic projections and deadlines, was 
observed, resulting in higher imposition of costs to the end-users of the roads (Engel et al., 
2009a). On this basis, it is possible to argue the importance of proper management and risk 
analysis prior to the authorization of a PPP, for this all factors that may adversely affect the 
results of the investment must be taken into account. 
 According to Ménard (2012), one of the most important variables to be taken into 
account before making of an investment of this type lies in the risks these projects might 
possess. Facing this, Moszoro (2011) stated that “The efficiency of co-financing investments 
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by both public and private capital is not the decisive factor in establishing public-private 
partnerships. Behavioural factors which influence the way the risk is perceived are of much 
greater importance” (p. 1). 
Also, Soennen and Johnson (2008) deduced that political risk is an important factor 
for investment decisions in developing countries, and therefore it must be quantified. 
Likewise, AON (2014) mentioned that: “in the shifting economic and geopolitical 
environment of today, it is essential for organisations to have an integral, high level outlook 
of their corporate exposure to political risk for each of their portfolios” (p. 5). 
In addition, Díaz et al. (2007) stated that one of the tools to quantify and assess the 
investment risk is the country risk which, according to Villarreal and Córdoba (2010) is 
understood as: 
...country risk corresponds to a non-diversifiable risk which translates in the fact that 
capital suppliers, either via debt or equity, demand an additional profitability (cost) 
based on the greater managed risk they must assume, simply because the project is 
developed in a country with a sovereign risk perception. (p. 1)  
According to Shapiro (as cited in Nath, 2008) country risk is defined as: “...the risk 
associated with those factors which determine or affect the ability and willingness of a 
sovereign State or a borrower from a particular country ‘to fulfil their obligations towards one 
or more foreign lenders and/or investors’” (p. 2). 
This is associated with the likelihood of default to foreign creditors by a nation. One 
of the most popular indicators to measure this risk is the Emerging Markets Bonds Index 
(EMBI), designed by JPMorgan Chase & Co. The risks taken in count for this indicator are: 
(a) political risk, (b) sovereign risk, (c) liquidity risk, and (d) macroeconomic risk (Nath, 
2008). Now, it must be noted that this risk measurement methodology does not analyse it on a 
disaggregated basis by subnational divisions of the country, which makes it difficult to 
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determine the contrasts between subnational divisions of the countries to be studied. 
 So, risk analysis is focused, mainly, on the credit risk of government debt, for which 
the evolution in the prices of emerging market bonds issued in dollars is measured, and the 
spread between yields on such bonds and U.S. Treasuries is calculated. Thus, the higher the 
difference, the greater the credit risk for the country in question (Nath, 2008). However, as 
told by The Economist (2007, February 22), it has been observed a decrease in the 
importance of this indicator due to the increase in the share of the debt issued in local 
currency, which is not measured by the EMBI. Additionally, it limits the price of the bonds as 
risk factor measurement, which may give an incomplete picture of the political situation of 
the analysed country. 
Now, there are more specialized and wider country risk indicators, such as the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which was published in 1980. This indicator 
analyses a series of political, economic, and financial risk variables to provide an overall 
picture of the level of risk for investment projects in a given country, which gives prominence 
to political risk in the estimation as this represents the 50 % of the final indicator of country 
risk (PRS Group, 2013). 
Meanwhile, Moody's, a credit rating agency, provided a methodology that separates 
the construction and operation phases on investment projects (Moody's, 2007 [as cited in 
Demirag et al., 2012]). Usually, these measurements are made for civil engineering projects, 
where elements as the possibility of cost overruns, the value of the main backups for the 
construction contractors, and the yields of financial support, including bonds and credit notes, 
are estimated. However, this methodology does not specifically take into account variables 
such as political risk (Moody's, 2007 [as cited in Demirag et al., 2012]). 
Also, Ye and Tiong (2000) highlighted the importance of the Net Present Value 
(NPV) method to measure the profitability of an investment project through the calculation of 
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its profit over time. Up to this point, this tool can be considered to deliver a specific 
assessment for each project, however, if there is no clear information on the level of political 
risk affecting the place where investment will be developed, it is highly likely that earnings 
estimates will be incorrect because events associated to violence, corruption and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, among others composing the political risk variable that may generate a 
decrease in the profit and even the failure of the project. 
likewise, Ye and Tiong (2000) mentioned that a tool to avoid gaps in the NPV analysis 
is applying probability analysis, through which it is possible to examine the relationship 
between the base rates and the risk fee or rate for the project. Similarly, it is possible to 
determine the viability of the project in the context of investor confidence. However, if some 
risk variables are taken in an aggregate or generalized way, it is possible to not have an 
estimate of the actual risk level displayed by the locality where the investment project or 
PPPs will be executed. 
In this regard, Soennen and Johnson (2008) based their analysis on the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) methodology, which uses five components to measure investment 
risk, each variable containing other minor variables, for which a formula is used in order to 
rank the allocation of risk in banks. This methodology is copied from the U.S. model that 
failed in the 2009 crisis. As such, the CAPM is an asset pricing model to which the authors 
added the political risk variable to measure the viability of investment projects in emerging 
countries. Then, the equation proposed by the authors goes as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝑅𝑓 + 𝑝𝑟 + (𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐹𝑀𝑈𝑆) ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 
Where Rf is the U.S. risk-free rate; pr is the political risk prime; βproject is the Beta 
coefficient between the project and a similar one in the U.S.; βFMUS is the Beta coefficient 
between the developing country’s stock markets and the U.S. ones; and MRP is the market 
risk premium, obtained through observation of the historic values in the bond and capital 
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markets for the country in question (Soennen & Johnson, 2008). 
Then, it is possible to see the importance authors give to the perception of political 
risk which is associated to political violence in the country, since this is a factor that must be 
taken in count when assessing an investment in this kind of countries. However, the CAPM is 
based on risk estimates from a national perspective without taking into account subnational 
differences in an unbundled way, thus hindering its application to attain the goals of the 
current study. 
Additionally, Sachs et al. (2007), based on the definition of MIGA (1985), focused on 
evaluating political risk for investment through PPPs. In this manner, these authors divided 
the political risk into: (a) risks on convertibility and money transfer overseas; (b) risk of 
expropriation; (c) breach of contract risk; (d) the risk of political violence, the latter 
associated to acts of war, civil war, insurrection or civil disorder, terrorism, sabotage or riots 
caused by indigenous people and landlords; (e) legal - bureaucratic risk, and (f) non-
governmental actions. 
According to Thomas and Worrall (1990), expropriation risk is associated with the 
existence of short-term incentives for states to take ownership of private assets, aided by the 
lack of enforceability for international contracts, partially balanced against the need to create 
good relationships with investors to attract more in the future. Meanwhile, convertibility and 
money transfer risks are related to governmental decisions that might affect the conversion of 
earnings to foreign currency and remitting these abroad. An example can be found in China, 
where the yuan can only be converted into dollars to be sent abroad under government 
authorisation and only for current accounts (Wang, Tiong, Ting, & Ashley, 2000). 
Regarding these indicators, the existence of legal, regulatory and bureaucratic risk has 
been documented in multiple sectors. While analysing risks in supply chain management, 
Wagner and Bode (2008) stated that: 
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In many countries, authorities (administrative, legislative, regulatory agencies) are an 
important factor of uncertainty in the setup and operation of supply chains. 
Regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks refer to the legal enforceability and execution 
of supply chain-relevant laws and policies (e.g., trade and transportation laws) as well 
as the degree and frequency of changes in these laws and policies. This includes the 
ability to obtain approvals necessary for supply chain design activities and supply 
chain. (p. 311)  
In turn, non-governmental actions refer to the interest of power groups in the 
performance of PPPs, often seeing them as part of a larger political struggle. One example of 
the above can be found in public sector unions who are usually opposed to PPPs as they see 
them as a way to weaken their grasp by moving their duties to the private sector (De 
Bettignies & Ross, 2004). Other parties relevant for this type of political risk in Colombia are 
NGOs and local communities with previous consultation rights according to Colombian 
legislation. Finally, political violence was analysed in the next section. 
Associated to the former, the document of Sachs and Tiong (2009) stated that the 
most relevant and reliable for estimating political risk and its components is provided by 
qualitative empirical sources. Given this, these authors designed a methodology to convert 
qualitative information into quantitative, with the purpose of analysing it with the application 
of statistical tools. Therefore, this methodology is called Quantifying Qualitative Information 
on Risks (QQIR), through which the authors measured and classified political risk in China 
and other Asian countries. 
Then, the application of the QQIR follows the stages listed below: 
1. Identification of the cash positions at risk. 
2. Identification of the risk factors associated to each position and its subsequent 
structuring via influence diagrams. This way, for each factor the causes and consequences are 
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obtained from expert opinions, which are then coded using the Trapezoidal Fuzzy Numbers 
(TrFN). These ones refer to fuzzy numbers show characterized by measuring uncertain 
values, associated to a membership function, inside which an indicator between zero and one 
is assigned. Binding several of these creates a fuzzy set, which is used to develop the QQIR 
methodology. 
For the specific case of infrastructure projects, the QQIR method eases “...assessing 
political risk in build-operate-transfer infrastructure projects or allow for the valuation of 
guarantees, contractual options, insurances, contingent claims, contingency budgets, or 
determining the impact of risks on the credit quality” (Sachs & Tiong, 2009, p. 64). 
However, this methodology requires rigorous mechanisms for information gathering. 
For this, Sachs and Tiong (2009) highlighted the importance of categorizing the different 
levels of incidence, probability, and impact for each of the various risk types. However, the 
measurement is performed in a combined fashion on a national level. This in turn obstructs 
the decrease of the information asymmetry on decision making for a PPP project in a specific 
national region. 
Political Risk Factors in Colombia 
 According to the map created by Marsh & McLennan Companies (2013) and despite 
the reduction Colombia has had on its levels of political risk, the country is still catalogued as 
a high risk country in that topic displaying higher levels of risk than those of other developing 
countries such as: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Dominican Republic, 
Panama, Peru, Uruguay; Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Morocco, Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Oman, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, Ukraine, Malaysia, Mongolia and South Korea. This proves it is necessary 
to analyse the risks in the country, as it allows to decrease asymmetric information for PPP 
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investments in Colombia. 
  Additionally, the study found that the main indicator increasing political risk in the 
country is the risk of terrorism associated with the indicator of political violence as one 
component of political risk itself (Marsh & McLennan Companies, 2013). In this regard, 
although each of the factors affecting political risk were followed, as per the MIGA 
categorization, it is important to highlight the work of Vargas (2011) as it allows to glimpse a 
logic of violence and war in Colombia, which is persistent and occurs in a differentiated 
manner among the different natural regions of the country. 
Thus, Vargas (2011) stated that political violence has persisted throughout the history 
of the country, becoming a phenomenon that has defined other aspects of the Colombian 
society. 
...the persistence of the political violence has not locked economic growth 
substantially. On the contrary, there were periods of great political violence combined 
with high macroeconomic growth rates, as the second post-war era, which coincided 
with the bipartisan violence. The same thing happened during the late 80s. This has 
led some analysts to raise the need to study the likely relationship between violence 
and growth, and even to speak of a certain functionality of violence to the economy. 
(p. 121, free translation from the original in Spanish 
This is the result and also the consequence of a political culture that systemically 
limited political and social divergences, thus increasing social asymmetry and exclusion. 
Based on this, it can be said that the persistent conflict in Colombia is the consolidation of 
multiple interests and actors fighting against a precarious State that fails to meet all the 
demands of its population (Vargas, 2011). 
Facing the issue, the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP) (2008) 
concluded that the armed conflict and violence in Colombia are still in place since the 
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problems have not been permanently solved, and have led war logics to mutate into new 
scenarios, strategies, and motivations. In this sense, this think tank presented a set of elements 
that must be taken into account to lower the levels of violence in the country. 
Therefore, it is convenient for investors interested in performing PPPs in Colombia to 
take political risk into account from a subnational logic, since the factors increasing that risk, 
might appear in a differentiated and asymmetric way among the regions of the country.  
Public-Private Partnership Success 
Multiple studies have been carried out on defining success at PPPs. Hodge and Greve 
(2011) found that PPPs tend to be considered as successful, unless there are extreme cases of 
corruption or incompetence. Following up, the authors conducted a study on multiple success 
definitions employed when studying PPPs, and how these definitions were related to multiple 
definitions of PPP and partnership. 
One of these definitions saw five types of success in partnerships. Namely, “(a) 
achieving outcomes, (b) getting the process to work, (c) reaching emergent milestones, (d) 
gaining recognition from others, and (e) acknowledging personal pride in championing a 
partnership” (Huxham & Hubbert, 2009 [as cited in Hodge & Greve, 2011, p. 8]). Another 
definition laid out by Jeffares, Sullivan and Bovaird (2009, as cited in Hodge & Greve, 
2011), emphasised on the definition of performance at partnerships, viewed from the domains 
of democracy, policy goal achievement, transformation, connectivity, coordination and 
coalition/sustainability. From these domains, Jeffares et al. (2009, as cited in Hodge & Greve, 
2011) reached a broad definition for partnership performance, as follows: 
Partnership performance may be more broadly conceived and include consideration of 
the longer term relationship that might exist beyond the delivery of a particular 
project or programme, the wider benefits to particular individuals or partner 
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organisations or indeed to citizens and service users (p. 9). 
Meanwhile, McConnell (2010, as cited in Hodge & Greve, 2011) saw how policy 
success was seen from either the plain execution of the project or subjective interpretations, 
while stating that a policy can be judged as a failure despite having met its original goals, as 
there are detractors who do not support these original goals. From the above, three 
dimensions for policy success were defined: (a) process, defined as examining options and 
issues; (b) programmes, directed towards implementing tools aimed to solve these problems; 
and (c) politics, seen from political position and policy agenda. In turn, success could come 
from any of these three dimensions. 
Following the above and other authors, Hodge and Greve (2011) concluded that, 
unless an extreme case of corruption or incompetence arose, governments judged PPPs as 
successful no matter what, as success could come from different outcomes and 
interpretations. The former is compounded by the fact PPPs embed multiple goals, while 
success can be a rather subjective term depending on the values and visions of critics and 
proponents alike, leading to predefined results. 
Usually, when defining PPP success, multiple authors have boarded the subject from 
the general framework given by critical success factors, as defined by Rockart (1982). This 
has led to the implementation of this managerial concept on PPPs in multiple countries, using 
different approaches. Kwak et al. (2009) summed up the results of multiple studies, showing 
the critical success factors identified by these. Summing up, these authors found that, based 
on these existing studies, “the success or failure of a PPP project is dependent on: the 
competence of the government; the selection of an appropriate concessionaire; an appropriate 
risk allocation between the public and private sectors; and a sound financial package” (p. 59). 
One of the aforementioned studies was the one conducted by Jefferies, Gameson, and 
Rowlinson (2002), parting from a case study on the Stadium Australia BOOT project, 
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identified three critical success factors for ensuring a sustainable project: (a) consortium 
experience and reputation, (b) efficient approval processes and (c) innovation in financing 
and equity raising methods as ways to show the existence of a winning strategy. Meanwhile, 
Agrawal (2010) conducted a study to analyse the main factors behind successful public-
private partnerships in India under the BOT modality, making use of surveys conducted on 
experts. By making use of the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) techniques, the author 
found six critical success factors for these projects: (a) prevailing environment, (b) financial 
validity, (c) concessionaire consortium, (d) financial package, (e) risk allocation and (f) 
technical solution. 
On the other hand, Abdul-Aziz (2011) took a different approach when analysing the 
critical factors on housing PPPs in Malaysia. Instead of limiting itself to examine the 
presence of critical success and failure factors, the author also study how the absence of these 
affected the results of PPPs, in a positive or negative way, parting from the assumption that 
an absent factor did not necessarily lead to an impact on these projects. Following the above, 
and supported by descriptive statistics, the author found a set of critical factors, while also 
stating how the presence or absence of the same affected the outcome of these PPPs. 
In turn, Zhang (2005) highlighted the exposure of PPPs to multiple risk types, as well 
as the importance of proper risk allocation in these projects to ensure their success. For this, 
Zhang (2005) mentioned how proper identification of critical success factors could enhance 
resource and risk allocation, increasing the success of PPP projects. Thus, five critical success 
factors were identified: (a) favourable investment environment, (b) economic viability, (c) 
reliable concessionaire consortium with strong technical expertise, (d) sound financial 
package and (e) appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements (Zhang, 
2005). However, no mention was made to subnational administrative divisions while creating 
this set of critical success factors. 
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Finally, Hardcastle et al. (2005) studied the critical success factors behind PPP 
projects in the United Kingdom. For this, they designed a questionnaire incorporating 18 
factors extracted from existing literature, obtaining 61 responses. By making use of the 
principal component analysis technique to reduce dimensions on these factors, they extracted 
five main factors behind PPP success: (a) favourable economic conditions, (b) available 
financial markets, (c) effective procurement, (d) government guarantee and (e) project 
implementability. 
As shown by the above, there are multiple definitions of success in PPPs, even though 
the critical success factor approach has been adopted by multiple researchers. Defining these 
factors in the Colombian case was important, as a counterpart for political risk perceptions 
had to be found. It was also needed to observe the relationship between these, aiming to 
obtain a greater understanding of the impact of political risk on infrastructure projects. 
Agency Theory and Public-private Partnerships 
Agency theory, as known today, originated from the study carried out by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Throughout their research, the authors defined an agency contract as “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). The nature of the agents in 
the contract leads to the appearance of agency costs, classified as (a) monitoring 
expenditures, (b) bonding expenditure and (c) residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Such costs are incurred as to avoid two different problems: adverse selection, where 
asymmetric information before the transaction leads to inefficient resource allocation 
(Braendle, 2008), and moral hazard, where behaviors after the transaction lead to such 
allocation inefficiencies (Braendle, 2008). 
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So far, studies relating agency theory to public-private partnerships have dealt with 
the behaviours of both public and private parties under such agreements. Vining, Boardman 
and Poschmann (2005) mentioned how it was often assumed that a common assumption 
behind PPPs was that private parties always had lower agency costs than their public 
counterparts, due to their greater incentives to minimise costs. 
However, according to Vining et al. (2005), PPPs were also prone to conflict between 
the parties, high contracting costs due to the complexity, uncertainty and specificity of these 
projects, opportunistic behaviour by a private party trying to exploit the desire the public 
contractor might have in ending the project as soon as possible, and failure, after reviewing 
six PPP projects in the United States and Canada. From the study, the authors concluded that 
contracts must be designed in a way that guarantees that private parties actually assume the 
risks they chose to bear in exchange for their participation and payment from these contracts. 
In turn, Rui, De Jong and Ten Heuvelhof (2010) sought to identify strategic 
behaviours on PPP projects carried out in China, for which they took agency theory as a 
starting point. Those authors found that behaviours such as collusion, often deriving from 
information advantages held by the agents, as well as procedures to minimise adverse 
selection issues. Also, fixed periodical payments were proposed for dealing with moral 
hazard. 
 As a conclusion, agency theory has been used in order to study the efficiency of 
public-private partnerships, as well as serving as one key theoretical piece for their adoption. 
Due to the prevalence of adverse selection, it is required that the relationship between the 
parties is outlined by well-defined contracts. Thus, proper identification of risks at all levels 
is necessary, as incorrect risk allocations and uncertainty on these lead to increased 
transaction costs and a greater likelihood for future disputes between the parties. 
Public Policy Theory and Public-Private Partnerships 
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Studies on public policy theory were established to improve the public sector’s 
organizational performance and actions (Lasswell, 1996, as cited in Valencia & Álvarez, 
2008), by analyzing the results and changes in public policies, as to explain why governments 
choose to implement a particular policy (John, 2013), all under a technical, scientific and 
rationality intended to find the best solutions for public sector problems (Ejea, 2006). 
One of these approaches to public policy was the new public management model 
(Ejea, 2006). Two core elements for this model were adopting the notion that politics do 
affect government performance, as well as accepting that public goods provision could be 
carried out in cooperation with non-state parties. Such postulates seemed to fit public-private 
partnerships, as these were seen as an intermediate option to allow the participation of private 
parties in providing public goods (Evenhuis & Vickerman, 2010; Hodge & Greve, 2007; 
Navarro & Hernández, 2009), being seen as a “third way, promising the advantages of 
privatization while avoiding its pitfalls” (Engel et al. 2009a, p. 1). 
However, studies on the efficiency of the adoption of the new public management 
model led to mixed results. Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, and Tinkler (2005) found how this 
public policy theory, widely adopted on the principles of disaggregation, competition and 
incentivisation has not delivered the intended results on citizens’ welfare, partly due to the 
increased institutional and policy complexity associated to these contractual agreements. An 
example of these issues was found in public-private partnerships in the UK, mentioning how 
these were criticised due to high exit costs and inadequate risk management, which led to the 
UK government limiting or banning their use for certain public sector services (Dunleavy et 
al., 2005). 
From the above, it could be concluded that, while certain public policy theories have 
favoured the adoption of public-private partnerships as a way to improve public service 
delivery, by promoting competition and incentives, these initiatives have not always had the 
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expected outcomes in cost-cutting and improved services. Once again, agency theory issues 
appear to be at the center of such problems, thus reinforcing the importance of proper risk 
identification at all levels for these to reach their full potential in service delivery. 
Summary 
 A review of literature considered as relevant for the current research was conducted in 
this chapter, outlining each of the focuses for the same and identifying major research gaps on 
the research considered to be contributions for the current work. Initially, the boom that PPPs 
have experienced worldwide was evidenced, despite the exposure of these partnerships to a 
number of significant risks during implementation. Therefore, an extensive exposure of the 
various types of risk to which such projects are vulnerable was performed, as well as an 
exposure on the measurement methodologies of the same, through which the absence of a 
means to determine the level of political risk in a disaggregated manner for the subnational 
divisions in each country was identified. 
 Finally, a characterization of the Colombian conflict was performed (as this is the 
country from which the sample is taken), which is marked by changes in the parties and 
motives for war. These are facts that justify the detailed analysis of these phenomena and 
their effects on the measurement of country risk for investments through PPPs in Colombia. 
Conclusion 
So far, an exhaustive analysis of the current status of PPPs in the national and 
international context has been conducted, alongside an analysis of the risks associated to this 
type of projects and an introduction to the Colombian context. As a result, it was found that 
political risk ranks highly among the risks faced by these projects, while in turn 
encompassing different types of risk, at different levels and related to multiple parties 
involved in these projects, such as contractors, governments and civil society. 
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Thus, it must be noted, as a gap in the existing literature on the subject, that the 
current methodologies of political risk assessment ignore the differences between the 
subnational divisions inside a country since these tools do not employ a subnational 
correction for any of the variables. With this, the purpose of analysing the impact of political 
risk at a subnational level on the probability of success of an infrastructure project executed 
through a PPP is justified, intending to give investors a better identification of the probability 
of success for a PPP project. 
Such disregard for the subnational level in the analysis of public-private partnerships 
could also be found when reviewing critical success factors for infrastructure projects, as the 
existing studies focused on national factors. Thus, the review of the available literature 
showed the need to analyse the influence on the success of public-private partnerships of 
political risk factors and critical success factors at the subnational level, as well as reviewing 






Chapter 3: Methodology 
In order to answer the questions proposed in the current research, the method to be 
employed is described next, consisting of structural equation modelling (SEM), designed to 
identify the relationship between political risk factors, critical success factors and region on 
infrastructure projects implemented under the figure of concessions. As complementary 
procedures, the collection of primary and secondary data required for conducting the research 
was performed first, followed by identifying the variables to be studied and its subsequent 
validation in a qualitative manner, through surveys on experts. 
Research Design 
The current study had a quantitative approach, an explanatory scope, and a non-
experimental design, employing structural equation modelling (SEM) to analyse how 
political risk factors influenced critical success factors for PPP infrastructure projects at the 
subnational level. In the model used for the research, six variables were selected for the 
political risk factors, specifically those defined by MIGA (1985): (a) currency 
inconvertibility, (b) breach of contract, (c) expropriation, (d) political violence, (e) legal and 
bureaucratic factors, and (f) non-governmental actions. In turn, there were three proxy 
variables selected to represent critical success factors for PPPs, namely four of the five 
factors mentioned by Hardcastle et al. (2005): (a) favourable economic conditions, (b) 
available financial markets, (c) effective procurement and (d) government guarantee.  
Finally, the probability of success or failure of the project was incorporated to the 
model as the dependent variable. A project was considered to be successful if finished, was 
still under construction or it was operational, while a project was considered to be a failure if 
it was cancelled, suspended or if it was distressed, that is, bordering any of those situations 
(Galilea & Medda, 2009). 
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In order to run the structural equation modelling, a set of preliminary stages were 
executed. Information on critical success factors for infrastructure projects in Colombia was 
obtained during the first complementary stage. This was performed through database 
enquiries for secondary data, seeking to obtain information on road infrastructure projects 
implemented in Colombia under the figure of concession until now. It must be mentioned that 
this information was collected only once, although the projects feature different dates during 
their implementation. The statistics on success factors were obtained from the Colombian 
National Police, the Colombian Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Financial Superintendence 
of Colombia. Finally, information on population projections for each department was 
obtained from DANE (2013). 
Meanwhile, the second stage involved the performance of questionnaires on experts 
(see Appendix A), in order to obtain information on the most relevant risk factors for the 
implementation of infrastructure projects in Colombia, take an initial look at the importance 
of political risk on this kind of project in the country, and analyse the applicability of these 
factors on PPP projects to be executed in the future. A final questionnaire was deployed on 
subnational public functionaries and on other local stakeholders (see Appendix B), such as 
construction firms, financiers and professionals surrounding infrastructure projects, to gather 
information on the significance of political risk factors on infrastructure projects. 
Using the data gathered from the surveys, as well as that data obtained from 
secondary databases, a set of analyses of variance was performed in order to review the 
relationship between categorical variables, and risk and success factors. Specifically, it took 
political risk factors and the proxies for critical success factors as independent variables, 
while taking the region and the sector this person belongs to (either private or public) as the 
categorical variables. Also, to test the existence of a significant relationship between political 
risk and critical success factors, a bivariate Pearson correlation matrix was obtained. 
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Now, it is important to define the statistical techniques that were employed. Structural 
equation modelling (SEM) is defined as: 
…multivariate technique combining aspects of factor analysis and multiple regression 
that enables the researcher to simultaneously examine a series of interrelated 
dependence relationships among the measured variables and latent constructs 
(variates) as well as between several latent constructs. (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2009, p. 634) 
A SEM involves two types of variables: latent variables, and measured variables. 
Latent variables are defined as variables that cannot be measured directly, but that can be 
measured or represented through one or more measured variables. The latter are known as 
measured variables which, as a group, give an adequate representation of the latent variable 
(Hair et al., 2009). This technique has proved to be a useful tool for both the academic field 
and everyday applications, due to its ability to evaluate multiple dependence relationships at 
the same time. Such a feature allows answering questions and analysing theories that require 
reviewing multiple relationships simultaneously using latent variables (Hair et al., 2009). 
An example of the application of SEM for studying risk at infrastructure projects is 
found in the study developed by Eybpoosh, Dikmen, and Birgonul (2011), who employed 
said technique for analysing the relationship between risk factors during the development of 
166 international construction projects carried out by Turkish contractors. These authors 
focused on risk paths, connecting individual risk factors in multiple ways, using data gathered 
from international construction projects developed by Turkish contractors. Using SEM 
allowed the researchers to analyse not only the relationships between individual risk factors,   
and other factors in more advanced stages of the project. 
It must be stated, though, that there was uncertainty on the distribution of the data to 
be gathered from the surveys, as well as on the data coming from secondary databases, due to 
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lack of knowledge on the structure of the population. This problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that SEM relies on the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution (Hu, 2010). This led 
to the adoption of nonparametric bootstrapping simulation for estimating mediation effects, 
following Hu (2004).  
Bootstrapping is defined as a sampling and inference technique, seen as the 
construction of a subset of small samples from a larger sample, instead of using the 
population directly, always keeping replacement at the time of taking the values for the 
creation of the samples (Fox, 2002; Singh & Xie, 2008). It is deployed to obtain confidence 
intervals for the descriptive statistics of a sample, optimise and correct biases in the results of 
a regression, or approximating the sampling error (Singh & Xie, 2008). 
So far, no examples have been found on the application of bootstrapping to validate 
an analysis of public-private partnerships. However, said technique has been utilised for the 
analysis of infrastructure projects, to validate the results obtained from a regression model 
intended to calculate the costs for these projects, through the definition of confidence 
intervals for the values obtained from a linear regression (Fragkakis, Lambropoulos, & 
Pantouvakis, 2010). 
Appropriateness of Design 
It is necessary to approach the ontological and epistemological dimension of the 
current research, as these were required to decide on the research approach to be used in 
order to test the proposed research hypotheses. It must be mentioned that, according to Crotty 
(1998), epistemology is defined as “the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective and thereby in the methodology” (p. 3), while defining ontology as “the study of 
being. It is concerned with ‘what is’, with the nature of existence, with the structure of reality 
as such” (p. 10). 
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Crotty (1998) also mentioned how ontology and epistemology are usually intertwined 
in research, as both form the basis for creating the theoretical perspective from which the 
research methods are selected. Also, Crotty (1998) mentioned the complex nature of the 
relationship between ontology and epistemology, exemplified on how realism, an 
“ontological notion asserting that meaning exists in objects independently of any 
consciousness” (Crotty, 1998, p. 10) was compatible with opposite epistemological 
approaches such as objectivism and constructionism. 
That being said, as the adoption of an epistemological approach based on objectivism 
was decided for the current research, due to its association with positivism and the 
application of statistical analysis. It could be said that the current research also adopted 
realism as its ontological approach. In turn, a quantitative scope was adopted, following a 
non-experimental design, in which the current conditions of phenomenon were detailed 
through data from different sources. The explanatory approach originated from the need to 
prove the impact of political risk measure from its critical success and risk factors. The 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study are laid out in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Epistemological and ontological dimensions of the current study. Adapted from 
“Demystifying Ontology and Epistemology in Research Methods”, by Al-Saadi, 2014 
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Regarding the selection of a quantitative scope, Creswell (2003) mentioned how the 
research problem directly determined the research approach, between quantitative, qualitative 
and mixed methods. In this case, a cause-effect analysis had to be conducted in order to 
assess how political risk and critical success factors at the subnational have affected the 
success of a public-private partnership infrastructure project, following studies on both 
political risk factors (Li, 2003; Engel et al., 2009a, Sachs et al., 2007) and critical success 
factors (Hodge & Greve, 2011; Zhang, 2005; Hardcastle et al., 2005). As the research sought 
to identify how significant the relationship was between these factors and project success, and 
there was extensive literature on the concepts underlying both the latent and measured 
variables, a quantitative approach was deemed as the most appropriate. 
After deciding to use a quantitative approach, selecting a statistical approach was the 
next step. It must be reminded that the study intended to measure the impact of political risk 
factors at subnational levels such as governorships and municipalities, as well as that of 
critical success factors, on the success or failure of infrastructure roads projects in developing 
countries. Facing this, the use of structural equation modelling was adequate due to the need 
of analysing both the impact of political risk factors on critical success factors, and how these 
critical success factors affected the existence of infrastructure projects. 
The existence of critical success factors as an intermediate variable was influenced by 
both political risk factors and project success, which meant an interaction in a logistic 
regression model would not have been enough to capture the research questions. In turn, 
incorporating political risk and critical success factors as latent variables allowed to simplify 
both the interpretation and the separation between factors. Finally, as there was no guarantee 
that data from surveys would follow a normal distribution, a linear discriminant analysis 
model was discarded. Given the above and its applications on multiple studies related to PPPs 
(Eybpoosh et al., 2011; Ng et al., 2010), SEM was deemed as appropriate. 
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In turn, there was uncertainty on both the nature of the data obtained from the sample 
and the final sample size, leading to potential bias on the SEM. For this, the bootstrapping 
technique permits to verify and correct biases in the estimators obtained from the SEM, as 
well as constituting an internal validation technique proven to deliver the best results given 
limited sample sizes (Steyerberg, Harrell, Borsboom, Eijkemans, Vergouwe, & Habbema, 
2001). Also, the nonparametric nature of this technique is an important asset for this function, 
as well as its easy implementation (Singh & Xie, 2008). 
Similarly, surveys on experts were employed to identify properly the relevance of 
political risk factors on the implementation of public-private partnerships. This choice is due 
to the current state of public-private partnerships in the country selected to carry out the 
study, Colombia, where the figure was officially implemented through the Ley 1508 of 2012 
after a long experience with concessions. This in turn, hindered the implementation of a 
quantitative study on this subject in the country, given the absence of sufficient observations. 
The Said shortage led to use experience in road concessions as a proxy for the analysis of 
PPPs in the country, while the panel of experts allowed verifying the suitability of this 
approach.  
Finally, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique allowed to determine whether 
there are significant differences in the means of a variable, between multiple categories of a 
dependent variable (Hair et al., 2009). It has seen multiple applications in different fields, 
including the analysis of Public Private Partnerships throughout the world (Grossman, 2008; 
Lo Storto, 2013; Famakin, Kuma-Agbenyo, Akinola, & Onatunji, 2014; Williams, 2014). 
Research Questions 
The research questions proposed for the current study go as follows: 
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1. Are political risk factors at the subnational level related to both critical success factors 
for road infrastructure concession projects and the success of these? 
2. Are there subnational differences on the influence of political risk factors on the 
success or failure of a road infrastructure concession project developed through a 
public-private partnership? 
Population 
For the current study, the target population is formed by public officials in each of the 
municipalities located in the departments included in the study, the private investors investing 
in PPPs and selected stakeholders with interests in association with PPP. Thus, the offices of 
the mayors represented the main body of public administration at the municipal level. It must 
be noted, there were no exclusions of regions or municipalities, as this would have limited the 
scope of the research. Also, local information was not limited to the offices of the mayors, as 
potential local private stakeholders had to be taken into account as well. The departments 
from which respondents came from are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Participants per Department 
Participants per Department 
Department Count Share of respondents (%) 
Antioquia 13 17,81% 
  (continued) 
Department Count Share of respondents (%) 
Atlántico 2 2,74% 
Bolívar 1 1,37% 
Boyacá 2 2,74% 
Caldas 1 1,37% 
Caquetá 1 1,37% 
Córdoba 1 1,37% 
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Cundinamarca 20 27,40% 
Distrito Capital 21 28,77% 
Meta 2 2,74% 
Norte de Santander 1 1,37% 
Santander 2 2,74% 
Tolima 1 1,37% 
Valle de Cauca 5 6,85% 
 
On the experts selected for the survey sent to experts to review the questionnaire of 
Sachs (2007), these were chosen based on the institutions they worked for, given the need to 
review the survey from the point of view held by multiple stakeholders. Thus, these were 
selected from construction companies, banks, and government institutions, based on 
accessibility to their observations by the researcher due to both professional contacts and the 
“right to petition” requests. 
 Finally, regarding the included projects, information on the existing toll stations was 
taken from ANI (2014), and then processed in Excel. It must be mentioned that the selection 
of 2014 as the base year for the information on tolls, despite the existence of more recent 
data, was caused by the need to synchronise the said year with those years for which data on 
the other secondary data variables were available. 104 municipalities were thus deemed as 
having toll roads, thus benefitting from infrastructure road concession projects. In turn, the 
distribution of said municipalities among subnational regions was laid out in Table 4. 
Table 4 Tolls per Region 
Tolls per Region 
Region Count Share of total (%) 
Andean 53 50.48% 
Caribbean 34 32.38% 
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Pacific 11 10.48% 
Orinoquia 7 6.67% 
Amazon 0 0.00% 
Source: Adapted from data by Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI), 2014. 
Informed Consent 
At the beginning of the instruments employed for both the survey to experts and the 
political risk questionnaire, a letter indicated the purpose of the study was included in both 
physical and digital versions of these, asking for their consent. These can be found as parts of 
Appendices A and B. In the aforementioned letter, all of the participants were informed of the 
research goals, procedures and a confidentiality guarantee on the responses and the published 
results. It should be mentioned that no kind of incentive for the performance of the survey 
was offered, other than knowledge and the promise of a copy of the final research work, 
should they wish to obtain one, while guaranteeing their confidentiality and that of other 
participants. 
Sampling Frame 
Regarding the sample size for structural equation modelling, Hair et al. (2009) 
mentioned how sensitive SEM was to sample size, compared to other multivariate 
approaches, due to the type of statistical techniques used for estimating its parameters. Hair et 
al. (2009) also gave a minimum sample size of 100 observations for models with a maximum 
of five latent variables and at least three measured variables per latent variable. However, 
Hair et al. (2009) also mentioned how there are multiple criteria for sample sizes in SEM 
models, with different opinions depending on the existence of multivariate normality, the 




The above is reinforced by the existence of multiple existing rules of thumb to 
determine ideal sample sizes, including absolute total numbers and relative numbers 
according to the number of variables, as mentioned by Wolf, Harrington, Clark, and Miller 
(2013). After analysing required sample sizes for models with different factors using Monte 
Carlo simulation, Wolf et al. (2013) found that “one size fits all” approaches for SEM sample 
size were not the best option for estimating these models, while also finding that the number 
of observations required per measured variable actually decreased as the number of measured 
variables per latent variable increased, calling for researchers to evaluate sample size 
requirements based on the type of model they want to estimate. 
For the purposes of the current study, the criterion laid out by Iacobucci (2010) was 
adopted, which states that a researcher must aim for a sample size of at least 50. Also, on 
missing data, observations that either had incomplete responses to political risk factors or 
worked in fields deemed as unrelated to public-private partnerships by the researcher were 
deleted. This led to the final sample size of 73 observations. A study carried out by Ng, 
Wong, and Wong (2010), in which SEM was employed to analyse the relationship between 
political, technical, financial, economic and social factors with project feasibility, and the 
relationship between the latter and stakeholders’ satisfaction, employed 181 observations for 
a model with 21 measured variables and seven latent variables. Given that the model 
proposed for the current research was less complex, involving two latent variables and 10 
measured variables, sample size requirements were lower. 
For the stage to be performed at the subnational levels, the capture of information for 
the entire population of the target group was proposed, for which it was not necessary to use a 
sampling method. However, it was likely that not all municipalities would cooperate with the 
development of the survey, either for reasons of confidentiality, lack of interest or neglect. 
Also, it was expected for the interviews with other stakeholders to be heavily concentrated in 
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Bogota, due to the economic and political importance this city holds. 
Thus, closed questionnaires were conducted on eight representatives of the involved 
parties in infrastructure projects: construction firms, financiers, regulators and local 
authorities. The survey designed from the opinions of these experts was originally 
implemented on the 32 governorships and 1,122 mayor offices existing in Colombia (DANE, 
2013). It was also sent to a convenience sample of other stakeholders, in order to complement 
municipal authorities. This additional sample mostly included stakeholders established in 
Bogotá, but whose economic activities were developed mainly in Colombian regions other 
than the Andean one. These stakeholders were chosen based on accessibility and their 
working fields. 
Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of respondents is guaranteed since no personal data was required 
from the mayors and businessmen, however it is important to provide information about the 
municipality department and region to which it belongs, in order to allow the realization of 
the mapping. It is worth noting that anonymity can ensure the collection and quality of the 
responses delivered by the participants. Participants were told about confidentiality and how 
their names would not be published in the introduction letter of both the survey to experts and 
the questionnaire on political risk factors, as shown in Appendices A and B.  
Geographic Location 
The sample on which the surveys were deployed covered representatives for all of the 
Colombian municipalities. There were no plans to involve personal foreign to the regions, in 
order to obtain a local view of the risks and opportunities associated to infrastructure projects 
in the country. In the final sample, stakeholders from 14 departments were present. Figure 6 
shows the Colombian map, with the corresponding departments from which responses were 
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obtained highlighted in black. 
 
Figure 6. Colombian departments of survey participants 
Instrumentation 
The instrument employed by Sachs (2007) was selected for the development of the 
current study, on which a series of modifications aimed towards using concrete values instead 
of Likert scales were conducted, as well as questionnaires on experts served to analyse the 
possibility to perform adjustments on the instrument for the Colombian environment. 
For the development of the SEM, a latent variable labelled as political risk factors 
was included. In turn, a set of measured variables shown in Table 2 followed the definition of 
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MIGA (1985). For all factors, perceptions of political risk at the municipal level were taken 
through the final survey instrument shown in Appendix B, which was corrected after the 
survey on experts during the previous stages, using a percentage scale ranging between 0 and 
100 to indicate the perceived degree of importance for a given political risk factor, seeking to 
obtain these perceptions at the municipal level. 
Another latent variable was added as well, critical success factors, for which a set of 
measured variables was chosen. In order to measure effective procurement, the Índice de 
Gobierno Abierto (Open Government Index) by the Colombian Public Prosecutor’s office 
was selected as a measure for transparency and effectiveness of municipal authorities. Also, 
government guarantees were measured from personal security, leading to the choice of theft 
rates per 100 thousand inhabitants at the municipality as the proxy variable. 
In turn, access financial markets and overall economic environment were approached 
by using outstanding credit portfolio per capita at the municipalities, crafted from data 
published by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia. Finally, a dummy variable 
indicating whether there is a concession infrastructure project in the municipality was 
selected as the final dependent variable. Its values were obtained from a database of road tolls 
on concessions under ANI and their respective municipalities, taking a value of one (1) if 
there was at least one toll inside the municipality, or a value of zero (0) otherwise. 
The employed variables are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5 Variables in the SEM Model 
Variables in the SEM Model 
Variable Type of variable Description 
CSF Latent Critical success factors 
PRF Latent Political risk factors 




Variable Type of variable Description 
RIX Measured Currency inconvertibility risk 
EXP Measured Expropriation risk 
RBC Measured Contract breach 
RVP Measured Political violence 
RLB Measured Legal and bureaucratic risk 
ANG Measured Non-governmental actions 
IGA Measured Open Government Index 
CAR Measured Credit portfolio per capita 
HUR Measured Theft rates per 100.000 inhabitants 
 
The overall scheme for the SEM model goes as shown in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7. SEM specification for latent and measured research variables included in this study. 
where Project was a dummy indicating whether there were infrastructure concessions in the 
municipality, CSF represented the latent variable “critical success factors”, and PRF 
comprised the latent variable “political risk factors”. 
The equations for the SEM model go as follows: 
𝑃𝑅𝐹 = 𝑅𝐼𝑋 + 𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝑅𝐵𝐶 + 𝑅𝑉𝑃 + 𝑅𝐿𝐵 + 𝐴𝑁𝐺 + 𝑒𝑃𝑅𝐹, 
𝐶𝑆𝐹 = 𝐼𝐺𝐴 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝐻𝑈𝑅 + 𝑃𝑅𝐹 + 𝑒𝐶𝑆𝐹, 




In order to collect this information, the questionnaires were administered 
electronically, through an online questionnaire created with Google Forms, or physically if 
required. This in order to ensure maximum convenience for respondents, seeking to increase 
the number of valid responses obtained. Consent notifications and full disclosure on the 
objectives of the survey were delivered to the respondents in parallel to the questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the survey was sent in physical form to all governorships, intending to 
maximise responses from municipalities. Finally, enquiries on public access electronic 
databases were performed to obtain the remaining data. 
As a first step for the execution of the doctoral dissertation, a survey was designed to 
ask experts over the perspectives they hold on public-private partnerships in Colombia. For 
this, the instrument employed by Sachs (2007) was selected as a starting point, on which a 
series of modifications aimed towards using concrete values instead of fuzzy logic were 
conducted, as well as the possibility to perform adjustments for the Colombian environment. 
Thus, interviews with people involved at the structuring and management of infrastructure 
projects in the country were arranged, making use of professional contacts. An initial 
convenience sample of 20 people to be interviewed personally was chosen at first, but it was 
not possible to arrange personal meetings to deal with these subjects due to time constraints. 
 Given these difficulties, and facing the need to capture the opinions of these experts, 
an alternative was found in using formularies with open questions, sent through mail and 
following an initial contact with the selected experts. Said survey asked them about their 
professional experience, opportunities, their perceptions on multiple risk types, and 
information on the contingency plans designed for hedging said risks and uncertainties. 
 Once these surveys were delivered, constant follow-up was conducted on the receivers 
of the same, seeking to ensure the highest possible number of responses and paying attention 
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to any question or doubt that could arise when filling the contents of the same. In the end, 
after a period of three months awaiting answers and a permanent follow up process on the 
selected experts, eight responses were obtained from experts contacted at the following 
entities:  
● Inversiones Gabra S.A., a construction firm based in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander. 
● Consultores del Desarrollo S.A. - CONDESA, a consulting and construction firm 
based in Barranquilla, Atlántico. 
● Banco de Occidente, a financial institution based in Bogotá, D.C. 
● Departamento Nacional de Planeación, the government administrative department in 
charge of planning, headquartered in Bogotá, D.C. 
● Ministerio de Hacienda, the Colombian Ministry of Public Finance, headquartered in 
Bogotá, D.C. 
● Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura - ANI, the regulating agency behind 
infrastructure projects in Colombia. Located in Bogotá, D.C. 
● Integrar Constructores S.A., a construction firm based in Cali, Valle del Cauca. 
● Construcciones El Cóndor, an engineering firm based in Medellín, Antioquia. 
Besides delivering the questionnaires to experts from these institutions, a pilot of the 
instrument to be sent to municipalities and other stakeholders on infrastructure was sent. 
After checking its length and conventions, modifications were performed on the latter, related 
to the length of the questionnaire, as well as on a greater clarification for the conventions. 
Next, contact was made with Fondo Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo (FONADE), and 
with the Federación Colombiana de Municipios (FCM), in order to obtain contact 
information for data collection from municipal authorities. 
Once these contact databases were obtained, these were analysed and filtered, seeking to 
correct typos in these. After that, the instrument was sent to the municipalities inside the 
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database, making use of a mail address specifically created for attending the needs of the 
current data collection process. The instrument was sent to the governors of the respective 
departments as well, in order to gather their perceptions and forward the document to the 
municipalities of their respective departments, in order to ensure a better response rate. For 
this, the “derecho de petición” (right to petition) was employed, since it is a Colombian legal 
concept used to obtain information from public entities and private companies, which are 
compelled to deliver a response to those under current legislation. 
 Besides mayors and governors, contact was established with professionals in other 
sectors related to infrastructure projects, belonging to the fields of law finance and 
construction, aimed towards collecting the perceptions of other participants in infrastructure 
projects, as a complement to the vision of elected officials from a different point of view. 
 Once the questionnaires were sent to the municipalities and other stakeholders on 
infrastructure via e-mail, using the right to petition figure, via physical mail to governors 
while requesting them to forward the instrument to municipalities, 269 responses were 
obtained. After discarding incomplete responses, as well as those responses coming from 
Bogotá but whose main economic interest lied in the Andean region, a final sample size of 73 
responses was obtained. 
 On the data corresponding to theft in municipalities, a database was requested to the 
Colombian National Police, with data for the year 2014, by making use of a right to petition. 
This data was crossed with population projections created by the Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) for that same year, in order to calculate the 
rates for these crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants, and thus allowing comparisons between 






Following the collection and obtention of data, from surveys and databases, the 
software known as SPSS, more specifically its associated tool AMOS, was selected for  
estimating the SEM, and thus performing the required analyses on the obtained results. 
AMOS was selected due to its versatility, ease of use and constant employment on social 
sciences by multiple actors in the academy and business, as well as due to availability to the 
researcher.  
For the databases to be employed, the results were organised in Excel spreadsheets, 
given their ease of use and the categorisation for the variables to employ. Thus, data obtained 
from the questionnaires on political risk factors sent to municipalities and stakeholders was 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet and organized there. In turn, additional variables were 
entered such as dummy variables for regions and projects, as well as secondary data for 
variables such as Open Government Index, outstanding credit portfolio per capita, theft and 
the existence of projects in the municipality, using the latter as a reference. Finally, the data 
for theft was normalized to a rate per 100 thousand inhabitants, using population numbers to 
calculate that rate. 
Once data was prepared, the spreadsheets were imported to SPSS. There, the type of 
variable was set for each variable using the “Variable View” tab. Thus, the nine variables that 
acted as measured variables were set to be continuous, while other variables such as region 
and dummy variables, including the existence of PPP projects in the municipality, were set as 
discrete, nominal variables. This selection was done following at the researcher’s discretion, 
by looking at data and analysing both its behaviour and scale. 
Validity and Reliability 
In order to test the reliability of the instrument, a Cronbach’s alpha was used to 
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confirm internal consistency (Hair et al., 2009). It was deployed on the scores associated to 
the six questions where respondents were asked to enter their perceptions on political risk 
factors through a continuous scale, in order to verify its reliability and internal consistency. 
The obtained score was 0.801, which is considered as a good result. This leads to conclude 
that these questions were internally consistent. Also, and due to the small sample size, the use 
of bootstrapping was decided as its use has been recommended when the  sample size is 
lower than 200 (Porritt, Sufi, Barlow, & Baker, 2014). 
On the validation of the model, global model fit had to be assessed before reviewing 
individual paths between variables (Urbano, 2013), to assess whether the model obtained 
from data is an accurate representation of the theory behind it (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 
2008). Unlike regressions, multiple goodness-of-fit indicators must be employed for SEM, in 
order to gather information on both absolute and relative fit indicators. Specifically, the 
selected indicators were: (a) chi-square test, (b) root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), (c) comparative fit index (CFI), and (d) normed chi-square (CMIN/DF) (Hair et 
al., 2009; Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). The results for said indicators showed proper 
results, following the rules of thumb laid out by Hooper et al. (2008) and Iacobucci (2010), 
meaning an acceptable model fit. These are show in Table 6: 
Table 6 Fit Indicators for the SEM Model 
Fit Indicators for the SEM Model 
Fit indicator Rule of thumb Result 
Chi-square test >0.05 (Iacobucci, 2010) 0.108 
RMSEA <=0.07 (Hooper et al., 2008) 0.065 
CFI >=0.95 (Iacobucci, 2010) 0.955 







In order to test the research hypotheses and respond the research questions, the 
application of a quantitative method is proposed, dominated by structural equation modelling, 
to analyse the relationship between political risk, critical success factors and the probability 
of success for an infrastructure project. A qualitative stage preceded the above, in which 
surveys were applied on experts from relevant institutions, seeking to obtain information on 
the most relevant factors for the success or failure of infrastructure projects in Colombia, the 
relevance of political risk and the applicability of these factors to PPPs. 
Next, structural equation modelling was employed in order to analyse the role played 
by political risk factors on the critical success factors of an infrastructure project, as well as 
the effect of the latter on the success of the project, taking information from concession 
projects. To this end, a combination of surveys using continuous scales and secondary data 
was used. At this stage, information for all Colombian municipalities was taken into account, 
as well as information from other relevant stakeholders. Given the sample size, the SEM was 
supported by bootstrapping in order to correct estimator bias. 
Finally, analyses of variance were performed to analyse the relationship between 
critical success and political risk factors, and categorical variables associated to the 
respondents. With all of the above, it is intended to obtain a clear vision of the role and effect 
of the political risk on infrastructure projects in Colombia, and how this type of risk, as well 
as these critical success factors, affect the performance or success of the projects to be carried 




Chapter 4: Results 
Throughout the current chapter, the results of the data collection performed for the 
current dissertation are shown, in order to study the importance of political risk perceptions 
and critical success factors on the development of infrastructure projects via public-private 
partnerships. Initially, an extended description of the final sample to be used on the study was 
carried out, followed by a description of the collected data and the descriptive statistics 
associated to the same. Finally, a data summary was put forward, before continuing to 
chapter 5 for analysis and conclusions. 
Respondents’ Profile 
Seventeen of survey respondents work, on infrastructure projects in the public sector, 
representing 23.3% of respondents, while 56 of these worked in the private sector, equivalent 
to 76.7% of respondents. That reflects the greater emphasis on municipalities and other 
subnational authorities during sample selection. These results can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7 Sector in which Respondents Participate on Infrastructure Projects 
Sector in which Respondents Participate on Infrastructure Projects 
Sector Count Share of respondents (%) 
Private 17 23.3 
Public 56 76.7 
 
On the gender of participants, a question on the subject was not included in the 
questionnaire, so there is no final information on the subject. However, inferences on gender 
were made using the e-mail addresses of respondents, to determine whether the survey was 
responded by a male or a female. For cases where no gender could be determined from the e-
mail address, the category “genderless” was created. Results are shown in Table 8: 
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Table 8 Gender of Respondents 
Gender of Respondents 
Gender Count Share of respondents (%) 
Male 28 38.36% 
Female 19 26.03% 
Did not specify 26 35.61% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Regarding the work field of the respondents, an option was opened for multiple 
responses, thus leading to multiple combinations as a respondent might perform multiple 
roles on an infrastructure project, as well as on their daily lives. Thus, the number of times 
respondents stated their role in any of the categories was counted, as shown in Table 9, 
regardless of their main activity. Due to the aforementioned multiple responses, the sum of 
frequencies is greater than the sample size, and the sum of shares exceeds 100%: 
Table 9 Frequencies for Work Fields 
Frequencies for Work Fields 
Work field Count Share of respondents (%) 
Public servant 36 49.32% 
Private sector 48 65.76% 
     Project structuring 14 19.18% 
     Professional consultant 13 17.81% 
     Contractor/construction 12 16.44% 
Contractual department for infrastructure 
projects 
5 6.85% 
     Investor 3 4.11% 
     Financial system 1 1.37% 
Student 5 6.85% 
84 
 
As shown in Table 9, it was found that the most common activity among respondents 
was the role of public servants, with nearly half of respondents involved in such activity. The 
second most frequent work field was that of project structurer, with 14 participants involved 
in such role, followed by professional consultants and contractors or constructers. This also 
reflects the nature of the sample, and its focus on municipalities and public entities. However, 
it also reflects that respondents are involved in infrastructure projects, one way or another.  
Table 10 Region Considered as the Most Relevant for Professional Activities 
Region Considered as the Most Relevant for Professional Activities 
Region Count Share of respondents (%) 
Andean region 41 56.16% 
Caribbean region 17 23.29% 
Pacific region 9 12.33% 
Orinoquia region 5 6.85% 
Amazon region 1 1.37% 
Total 73 100% 
 
Table 10 shows the number of times respondents mentioned a geographical region as 
the most relevant for their professional activities. Despite discarding those respondents 
located in Bogota whose main activity focus lied on the Andean region, the latter 
concentrated most respondents: 41 respondents, equivalent to 56.2% of the total, mentioned 
that region as the most important one for their activities. It was followed by the Caribbean 
region with 17 (23.3%), the Pacific region with 9 (12.3%), the Orinoquia region with 5 
(6.8%), and finally the Amazon region with 1 respondent (1.4%). 
 The dominance of the Andean region among respondents shows the population and 
economic preponderance of that region. On the one hand, the Andean region is the most 
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populated in Colombia. According to population projections created by DANE (2013), there 
are 26,853,141 people living in that region, thus representing 55.7% of the Colombian 
population. On the other, economic activity is more pronounced in that region, reaching 
63.3% of Colombian GDP in 2014 (DANE, 2015). 
Findings and Discussion  
Results from Surveys on Experts 
After collecting the information retrieved through the surveys, it was analysed and 
compared. Following that, a set of trends was found on the answers, which shall be displayed 
below. The respondents are mentioned using the name of the company or State entity, but it 
must be stated that these surveys were filed by people working at internal departments 
dealing with risk, and that these do not necessarily reflect an official position of said entities. 
 When it came to PPP opportunities at the country in the future, Gabra stated there 
were plenty of opportunities for projects to be conducted as PPPs in the country, provided 
there is adequate planning, as well as sound prefeasibility and feasibility studies. Meanwhile, 
Banco de Occidente mentioned the peace process and government support for national and 
foreign investors as factors at the offering of more PPPs in the future. 
 On the other hand, both the DNP and the ANI mentioned the importance of the Ley 
1508 and its reforms on the role of delivering new opportunities for PPPs in the country. 
More specifically, the DNP sees the Act as a way to create a contractual structure designed 
for the provision of public services by an alliance of both public and private sectors, opening 
opportunities for long-term private investors, access to financing and better managerial skills, 
better project structuring leading to adequate risk management, and State resources 
optimisation and alignments of interest between the parties, due to a proper legal framework. 
At Ministerio de Hacienda, the importance of said legal framework reform and the existence 
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of a risk allocation meant to attract private parties was mentioned as well. 
 When it comes to the sectors with the most potential for attracting PPPs in Colombia, 
all participants agree on the potential of roads and other transport infrastructure projects in 
fields such as airports maritime ports and railroads as those with the most potential to attract 
investors. Other sectors where they identified PPP opportunities were social services, schools, 
universities, hospitals and healthcare services, parking lots, agriculture, public and private 
offices, entertainment centres and the military. As potential locations: the Andean, Pacific 
and Orinoquia regions were identified as those with the most potential. 
 On the risk factors, those experts saw as the most relevant for the success of the 
projects, multiple interviewees highlighted the importance of legal and bureaucratic risk, 
specifically referring to instability due to changes in legislation and elected officials. One of 
the facets behind this risk was detailed by Condesa, referring to the fact that as the electoral 
season closes in, and also that newly elected officials disregard those plans laid out by their 
predecessors, thus affecting continuity and those parties involved in the execution of the 
plans. 
Other factors mentioned as risk factors were communities, financing, environment, 
government capabilities and traffic (Cóndor); security, minorities and ethnicities, 
improvisation during project structuring, and on its terms and slow expropriations (Integrar); 
approval from the National Government to compromises from State entities, and risks 
specific to foreign investors (Occidente); the fact these are high investments with long-term 
profits (Gabra); and some related to construction, operation, commercial, financial, 
regulatory, land, environmental, force majeure and political risk (ANI). 
The responses from the DNP, however, pointed out to a completely different 
direction. Specifically, they pointed to a set of risk factors associated to PPP projects 
proposed by the private sector. Namely, potential misalignment between the expectations of 
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private and public sectors, a flurry of initiatives just to become a pioneer or the first in the 
row, a discouragement of public structuring, pressure on public functionaries, and limitations 
due to time, resources and effort constraints at the public sector. Meanwhile, Hacienda 
dismissed political risk as a very minor risk on the execution of these projects. 
When it came to the incidence of subnational factors on risk perceptions, there were 
mixed perceptions. While the person in Hacienda stated that the terms established in the Ley 
1508 lead to low exposure to subnational risk factors, Condesa sees them as the main source 
of uncertainty on their infrastructure projects, especially from local politicians. The dynamics 
of corruption and local politics were seen as a relevant factor by Gabra, while getting 
mentioned as well by Integrar. Meanwhile, DNP mentioned the importance of compliance to 
budget rules and concordance with development plans in public parties, while Integrar and 
Condor saw communities as local risk factors. Finally, public order was mentioned by 
Integrar and Banco de Occidente. 
Finally, when asked on the measures taken to mitigate these risks on infrastructure 
projects, Condesa stated there were no plans to be created around these risks, thus acting in a 
reactive manner. Meanwhile, Hacienda mentioned the existence of insurance for multiple 
types of risk, either through private insurance for private actors or through a contingency 
fund for public parties. Also, Integrar mentioned the importance of project continuity and 
long-term planning as a way to mitigate political risk coming from changes in administration. 
Gabra, Banco de Occidente and Condor highlighted the importance of central government 
support, as well as a mention to the current peace process, to help against these issues. 
Summing up, the surveys on experts showed risk perceptions from respondents, as 
well as their opinions on the political risk categories laid out by MIGA (1985). From these, it 
was found that said classification was adequate for the Colombian case, thus enabling its use 
for the questionnaire that was deployed throughout Colombian municipalities. In turn, 
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additional information on other relevant risks and risk mitigation techniques was obtained. 
Descriptive Results from the Political Risk Factors Questionnaire 
When it comes to scores on the political risk factors captured via surveys on 
municipalities and other stakeholders, Table 11 shows some descriptive statistics obtained 
from the data gathered through said surveys:  
Table 11 Mean and Median of Political Risk Factors 
Mean and Median of Political Risk Factors 
Political risk factor Mean Median 
Currency inconvertibility 47.05 50 
Expropriation 38.25 50 
Breach of contract 54.63 55 
Political violence 50.86 50 
Legal and bureaucratic risk 63.18 70 
Non-governmental actions 40.59 40 
 
As seen in Table 11, the political risk factor with the highest risk perception among 
respondents was legal and bureaucratic risk, which showed both the highest mean and the 
highest median. This result is consistent with the results obtained from the surveys applied on 
experts since this type of political risk was the most mentioned one by these. In turn, the 
lowest mean was found at expropriation risk, while the lowest median was found in “non-
governmental actions”. Results also match those of the survey on experts, as they did not 
mention risk factors associated to these categories. 
Finally, on the results of the descriptive statistics, Table 12 shows the number of times 
a political risk factor was found to be the most relevant for a respondent, that is, the number 
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of times respondents gave the highest risk perception score to each political risk factor. It 
must be noted that respondents could give the same score to more than one political risk 
factor at the time, which meant there was a chance for two or more political risk factors being 
rated the highest. Therefore, the sum of frequencies is greater than the total of respondents. 
Table 12 Number of Times a Political Risk Factor was the Most Relevant 
Number of Times a Political Risk Factor was the Most Relevant 
Political risk factor Count Share of respondents (%) 
Currency inconvertibility 22 30.14% 
Expropriation 23 31.51% 
Breach of contract 12 16.44% 
Political violence 21 28.77% 
Legal and bureaucratic risk 43 58.90% 
Non-governmental actions 18 24.66% 
  
As shown above, the legal and bureaucratic risk was found to be the political risk 
factor that most often received the highest risk perception score from survey respondents, 
with more than half of participants listing it as the most relevant one. In turn, breach of 
contract risk was the one who got the lowest number of respondents listing it as the most 
important political risk factor. It must be noted that, other than legal and bureaucratic risk, the 
differences on frequencies between political risk factors are not too marked, which further 
highlights the importance of legal and bureaucratic risk in Colombia, after taking the 
responses from the surveys on experts into account. 
From the results of these two tables, it could be stated that legal and bureaucratic risk 
is the most relevant risk among the respondents of the survey on political risk perceptions at 
the subnational level, well above the perceptions held on other political risk factors. This 
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could be associated to the selected country itself, as there are well-known issues with 
corruption and legal insecurity. It must also be noted the relatively mediocre scores obtained 
by political violence, which might be an indicator that, while said factor remains relevant to 
Colombian infrastructure projects, it is no longer the main hurdle for these, thus signalling the 
effects of the recent internal conflict de-escalation in the country.  
Political Risk and Critical Success Factors at Road Infrastructure Concession 
Projects  
Before running the SEM model, a bivariate Pearson correlation test was run in order 
to verify the existence of relationships between the proposed measured variables. A matrix 
with the results of said test is displayed in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 Bivariate Pearson Correlation Matrix for Measured Variables 
Bivariate Pearson Correlation Matrix for Measured Variables 
  RIX EXP RBC RVP RLB ANG CAR IGA HUR 
RIX Pearson 
correlation 
1 ,301** ,196 ,408** ,223 ,112 ,137 -,062 ,179 
 Significance   ,010 ,096 ,000 ,058 ,346 ,249 ,601 ,130 
EXP Pearson 
correlation 
,301** 1 ,554** ,507** ,401** ,402** ,158 -,133 ,115 
 Significance ,010   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,181 ,262 ,331 
RBC Pearson 
correlation 
,196 ,554** 1 ,458** ,670** ,477** ,170 -,187 ,121 
 Significance ,096 ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,149 ,112 ,310 
RVP Pearson 
correlation 
,408** ,507** ,458** 1 ,583** ,398** ,262* -,256* ,226 




  RIX EXP RBC RVP RLB ANG CAR IGA HUR 
RLB Pearson 
correlation 
,223 ,401** ,670** ,583** 1 ,483** ,335** -,219 ,304** 
 Significance ,058 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 ,004 ,063 ,009 
ANG Pearson 
correlation 
,112 ,402** ,477** ,398** ,483** 1 ,119 ,002 ,120 
 Significance ,346 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,316 ,984 ,313 
CAR Pearson 
correlation 
,137 ,158 ,170 ,262* ,335** ,119 1 -,226 ,788** 
 Significance ,249 ,181 ,149 ,025 ,004 ,316   ,055 ,000 
IGA Pearson 
correlation 
-,062 -,133 -,187 -,256* -,219 ,002 -,226 1 -,262* 
 Significance ,601 ,262 ,112 ,029 ,063 ,984 ,055   ,025 
HUR Pearson 
correlation 
,179 ,115 ,121 ,226 ,304** ,120 ,788** -,262* 1 
 Significance ,130 ,331 ,310 ,054 ,009 ,313 ,000 ,025   
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
As shown above, high correlation coefficients were obtained among measured 
variables belonging to the same latent variable, that is, there were significant correlations 
within political risk factors, as well as within critical success factors. In turn, there were 
significant correlations among some of the relationships between political risk and critical 
success factors; however, these correlations were not significant as often as those for 
measured variables associated to the same latent variable. 
As a reminder, both “political risk factors” and “critical success factors” were defined 
as latent variables. As measured variables for “political risk factors”, the six political risk 
factors defined by MIGA were selected: (a) currency inconvertibility, (b) breach of contract, 
(c) expropriation, (d) political violence, (e) legal and bureaucratic factors, and (f) non-
governmental actions. In turn, for the measured variables associated to the latent variable 
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known as “critical success factors”, three proxy variables were selected to represent critical 
success factors for PPPs. Namely (a) Public Prosecutor’s Open Government Index, (b) 
outstanding credit portfolio per capita, and (c) theft rates per 100 thousand inhabitants.  
In turn, the dependent variable represents the existence of successful infrastructure 
projects. For the latter, a database created from information supplied by the ANI, for 
municipalities with tolls for existing concession projects, as employed to create the dependent 
variable. If there was a toll inside the municipality, it was assumed there was a successful 
infrastructure project. If not, it was assumed there were no projects or failed projects, thus 
taking a zero. 
Hypothesis Testing – Research Question 1 
In order to solve the first research question, are political risk factors at the 
subnational level related to both critical success factors for road infrastructure road 
concession projects and the success of these?, a SEM model was created, through which the 
relationships between political risk factors, critical success factors and the success of 
infrastructure concession projects were analysed. 
A statistical significance of 5% was chosen for the coefficients. Also, for the 
bootstrapping, a random seed number was selected when defining regression parameters in 
AMOS, to ensure consistent results. Specifically, seed number 1 was chosen. Finally, for 
legibility purposes, outstanding credit portfolio per capita was converted to represent 
millions, dividing the original observations by one million. Finally, it must be stated that eX 





Table 14 SEM Results – Regression Weights 
SEM Results – Regression Weights 
Parameter   Estimate P-value Standard error 
CSF <--- PRF 0,253 0,02 7,935 
Projects <--- CSF 0,028 0,002 0,007 
EXP <--- PRF 1,601 0,002 55,688 
RBC <--- PRF 2,145 0,002 89,185 
RVP <--- PRF 1,854 0,002 55,835 
RIX <--- PRF 1 0 0 
RLB <--- PRF 2,075 0,002 82,139 
ANG <--- PRF 1,435 0,002 61,416 
IGA <--- CSF -0,294 0,061 0,164 
CAR <--- CSF 1 0 0 
HUR <--- CSF 17,336 0,002 3,522 
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
 
Table 14 shows the regression weights for the model, after running a SEM with 
bootstrapping under maximum likelihood, using 1.000 iterations. To ensure that a solution 
was found, regression weights of 1 were set beforehand for two relationships, one per latent 
variable: (a) the one between the latent variable PRF and the measured variable RIX, and (b) 
the one between the latent variable CSF and the measured variable CAR. The estimates show 
the magnitude of the paths in the SEM model, while the p-value shows the statistical 





Table 15 SEM Results - Intercepts 
SEM Results - Intercepts 
Parameter Estimate P-value Standard error 
CSF 0,247 0,003 0,051 
Projects 47,055 0,002 3,73 
EXP 38,247 0,002 3,288 
RBC 54,63 0,002 3,834 
RVP 50,856 0,003 3,496 
RIX 63,178 0,002 3,461 
RLB 40,589 0,002 3,202 
ANG 69,299 0,002 1,093 
IGA 8,808 0,004 1,096 
CAR 174,972 0,003 19,609 
HUR 0,247 0,003 0,051 
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
Table 15 shows the intercepts for the SEM model. The estimate shows the intercepts, 
defined as the initial value for each latent or measured variable, assuming all other variables 
equal zero. In turn, the p-value states the statistical significance of said value. 
Table 16 SEM Results - Variances 
SEM Results - Variances 
Parameter Estimate P-value Standard error 
ePRF 120,817 0,002 103,716 
eCSF 64,426 0,002 14,223 




Parameter Estimate P-value Standard error 
eEXP 472,108 0,001 80,769 
eRVP 429,273 0,001 111,765 
eRLB 272,275 0,001 78,144 
eANG 463,53 0,001 78,19 
eHUR 6157,911 0,175 4957,538 
eCAR 17,532 0,095 12,114 
eIGA 87,765 0,001 17,082 
eRBC 363,904 0,001 108,481 
eProject 0,13 0,001 0,023 
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
 
Finally, Table 16 shows the variance estimates for every latent and measured variable, 
with the p-value indicating the significance of said variance estimates. The SEM model 
results laid out in these three tables can be found in Appendix C. The final model can be also 
seen in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8. Estimated SEM model 
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For interpretation purposes, Table 14 was taken. Its results showed that all regression 
weights but one are significant at a 5% confidence, with the other one still being significant at 
a 10% confidence. On the coefficients themselves, most of them show expected behaviours: 
outstanding credit portfolio per capita is positively related with critical success factors, and 
the latter is positively related with success of a project. In turn, all measured variables for the 
latent variable PRF show the expected positive relationship with it. 
However, there were three outcomes that defied expected results: theft rates delivered 
a positive weight on critical success factors, and the open government index displayed a 
negative one. In order to explain the former, a prevalence of economic and planning factors 
could be mentioned: despite the inherent risk of operating in municipalities with fewer safety 
guarantees and lower government transparency, as shown by the results of these two factors, 
these factors are ignored by planners when drawing road courses, if found to be the most 
efficient from an economic point of view 
Most importantly, there was a relationship that defied the expected results: the one 
between the latent variables. That is, political risk factors had a positive regression weight on 
critical success factors, thus suggesting that the higher the political risk factors are, the higher 
the critical success factors for a project are. 
Table 17 shows the total effects for each latent variable as estimated under maximum 
likelihood, as well as their respective significances, estimated through bootstrapping: 
Table 17 SEM Results – Total Effects per Latent Variable 
SEM Results – Total Effects per Latent Variable 
 
PRF P-value CSF P-value SE-PRF SE-CSF 
CSF 0,253 0,02 0 0 7,935 0 
HUR 4,386 0,013 17,336 0,002 120,641 3,522 
CAR 0,253 0,02 1 0 7,935 0 
IGA -0,074 0,061 -0,294 0,061 1,421 0,164 





PRF P-value CSF P-value SE-PRF SE-CSF 
RLB 2,075 0,002 0 0 82,139 0 
RIX 1 0 0 0 0 0 
RVP 1,854 0,002 0 0 55,835 0 
RBC 2,145 0,002 0 0 89,185 0 
EXP 1,601 0,002 0 0 55,688 0 
Project 0,007 0,017 0,028 0,002 0,207 0,007 
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
 
The effects replicated the results obtained from the regression weights: most total 
effects were significant at a 5% confidence level, while the total effects for IGA were 
significant at a 10% confidence level. Most importantly, it was found that both latent 
variables displayed a significant total effect on Project, thus leading to conclude that both 
have a significant impact on the success of concession infrastructure projects. However, the 
problem of results on the effects of PRF on CSF going against the expected outcome remains. 
This finding merits special discussion in chapter 5. 
Hypothesis Testing – Research Question 2 
 For the hypotheses associated to the second research question, are there subnational 
differences on the influence of political risk factors on the success or failure of an 
infrastructure concession project developed through a public-private partnership?, an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. Table 18 shows the ANOVA between the 
most relevant region for professional activities, as defined by respondents, and political risk 








Table 18 ANOVA Table for Political Risk Factors and Most Relevant Region For Professional Activities 











RIX Between groups 3691.225 4 922.806 .868 .488 
Within groups 72282.556 68 1062.979   
Total 75973.781 72    
EXP Between groups 1975.840 4 493.960 .610 .657 
Within groups 55091.722 68 810.172   
Total 57067.562 72    
RBC Between groups 1565.326 4 391.332 .406 .804 
Within groups 65583.687 68 964.466   
Total 67149.014 72    
RVP Between groups 5294.647 4 1323.662 1.597 .185 
Within groups 56346.093 68 828.619   
Total 61640.740 72    
RLB Between groups 4295.324 4 1073.831 1.363 .256 
Within groups 53567.361 68 787.755   
Total 57862.685 72    
ANG Between groups 1503.241 4 375.810 .506 .731 
Within groups 50490.430 68 742.506     
Total 51993.671 72       
Note: the abbreviations for measured variables follow the conventions laid out in Table 5. 
 
As seen in Table 18, it was found that for none of the political risk factors, there were 
significant differences in means between the categories of the dependent variable. Therefore, 
there seem to be no significant subnational differences on political risk perceptions Thus, the 




 Throughout this chapter, the results for the surveys on experts, the questionnaire of 
political risk perceptions and the statistical techniques associated to the proposed research 
hypotheses (structural equation modelling and one-way analysis of variance) were displayed. 
From these, a greater understanding of political risk and critical success factors for public-
private partnerships at the subnational level was attained 
The current research was based on the existence of an intermediate level of political 
risk between the national-level risk analysed in the studies of Sachs and Tiong (2007), Zhang 
(2005) and Engel et al. (2009a), and project-specific risks as mentioned by Li (2003). Figure 
9 displays the incidence levels of political risk, as studied throughout the research. 
 
Figure 9. Incidence levels of political risk within an infrastructure PPP project 
The need to analyse these risks comes from studies on public private partnership, in 
which their effectiveness is being evaluated when compared to public procurement projects, 
concluding that PPP projects are only suitable for certain types of project (Iossa & Martimort, 
2008), with mixed results depending on the sector and the adopted contractual models 
(Barlow, Roehrich, & Wright, 2013). 
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When analysing such contract designs, proper risk identification and allocation have 
become key to ensure success. Thus, while some authors have focused on the shape of the 
contracts themselves, by allowing a certain flexibility for contractors to deal with unexpected 
issues (Oliveira & Cunha, 2013), others have reinforced the importance of proper risk 
identification and allocation between the parties, even stating that, under an optimal risk 
allocation scheme, a PPP contract resembles public procurement more than privatisation 
(Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2013).  
Finally, the study was carried out in the years after the implementation of the Ley 
1508 of 2012, which regulated PPPs in Colombia. González, Rojas, Arboleda, and Botero 
(2014) identified future research lines on the financing of such projects. One of these research 
lines involved evaluating the risk methodologies employed by credit rating agencies on these 
projects. 
Given the above, analysing political risk and critical success factors at the subnational 
level gained importance as a way to complement both risk assessment and risk allocation 
between the parties, as proper identification and allocation are required for the success of a 
PPP project. Also, as the current study focused on political risk above all other risk factors, a 
more specific analysis was required. Thus, it was important to analyse such relationship and 
its significance at the subnational level. 
First, it was possible to create a profile for the respondents to the survey on political 
risk factors at the subnational level. Most of these belonged to the public sector  while 
working extensively with the private sector. The former shows the importance of cooperation 
between both parties at the time of structuring and performing PPP projects. Also, the 
importance of the Andean region in Colombia was confirmed, which affected the results 
obtained from the current study. 
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Regarding the surveys sent to experts and stakeholders in Colombian PPP 
infrastructure projects, which included law firms construction companies and State 
institutions, these delivered additional information on the risks and opportunities perceived at 
the sector in the country. In their responses, it was seen that political risk was mentioned as 
one key factor, besides others beyond the scope of this study, with a special emphasis on the 
effects of corruption legal instability and elections. These are a match for the classification 
laid out by MIGA (1985), thus confirming its relevance and adequacy for the Colombian 
context. 
In turn, the descriptive statistics associated to the responses of the survey on political 
risk perceptions at the subnational level confirmed the importance of legal and bureaucratic 
risk, which showed the highest mean score, the highest median and the highest frequency as 
the most relevant factor among respondents. These results match those obtained from the 
surveys on experts, as some of the issues associated to this factor include corruption and legal 
or regulation changes. From the above, it could be stated that such political risk factor should 
be addressed by infrastructure sector authorities, in order to increase confidence and 
investment. 
From the hypothesis testing, the results were mixed. On the one hand, the relationship 
between political risk factors, critical success factors and the success or failure of 
infrastructure PPP projects was proved by the SEM at the national level, expanding on the 
results of the survey deployed by Sachs and Tiong (2007). However, no subnational 
differences on political risk and critical success factors were found using the one-way 
ANOVA technique. The former could be explained by national features such as a centralised 
government, or the quantitative approach selected for the problem. Further discussion on the 




 The current research was based on the proposition that critical success factors for road 
infrastructure public-private partnerships were influenced by political risk factors at the 
subnational level, located between national and contract-specific risk factors. The former was 
done due to a gap on the existing literature and measurement regarding the relationship 
between political risk at these subnational entities and the success of road infrastructure 
concession projects, the latter serving as proxies for public-private partnerships. 
In order to test the hypotheses associated to this proposition, a SEM model and an 
ANOVA were introduced. The SEM model analysed the relationship between critical success 
and political risk factors, as well as the relationship between these and the success of 
infrastructure projects. The ANOVA assessed the existence of differences in political risk 
perceptions between subnational divisions (regions). 
Throughout this section, a description of the data obtained was delivered, and the 
research hypotheses were tested using SEM for hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c, and ANOVA for 
hypothesis 2. It was found that hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c were accepted, while hypothesis 2 
was rejected. More specifically, the outcomes were as follows: 
 There was a significant indirect relationship between PRF and project success, 
confirming the idea that agents seek to minimise risk by identifying them. 
 Political risk at the national level is perceived as a key factor on the development of 
PPP projects, with a special emphasis on the effects of corruption, legal instability and 
elections. 
 Political risk and critical success factors did not display significant differences 
between subnational divisions; however, the importance given to political risk at the 
subnational level by survey respondents, as well as their perceptions on subnational 
differences, means that those variables could not be ignored. 
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 Analysing PRF and CSF at the subnational level gains importance as a means to 
complement risk assessment and allocation between the parties involved in the 
development of infrastructure projects. 
Using the results displayed so far, Chapter 5 deals with the interpretations for these 
results. Hypotheses were checked there, in order to expand on these rejections or acceptances, 
as well as potential reasons behind these results. Finally, closing remarks on the subject and 
discussion were disclosed in the said chapter as well.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The current research intends to study the impact of subnational political risk on the 
success of PPP infrastructure projects. This, in order to understand the relationship between 
those political risk perceptions, a set of critical success factors, and the existence of 
concession projects serving as a proxy for public-private partnerships, due to the recent 
implementation of PPPs in the country from which the sample was taken (Colombia). Now, 
there were limitations on the number of variables that were considered, as the focus was 
meant to be kept on political risk factors and critical success factors, ignoring factors such as 
the overall political system, specific legislation, and project implement ability.  In addition, 
only infrastructure projects carried out through concessions were considered, excluding 
projects in other sectors as well as projects under other contractual figures. 
 From the above, the conclusions for the current doctoral dissertation shall be put 
forward, by carrying out an analysis on the research questions and on hypothesis testing, 
either leading to partial or full rejection of a hypothesis. The information deployed in chapter 
4 shall be used for this purpose. Next, both academic and practical implications will be laid 
out. Finally, recommendations targeted to parties interested in PPP projects shall be 
delivered, as well as suggestions for further research. 
Conclusions 
 By making use of structural equation modelling and analysis of variance, the research 
sought to answer the proposed research questions. From the outcomes of these quantitative 
analysis techniques, the following hypotheses were accepted: 
H1a. Political risk factors at the subnational level have a direct, significant 
relationship with critical success factors for road infrastructure concession projects. 
105 
 
H1b. Critical success factors for road infrastructure road concession projects have a 
direct, significant relationship with the success of these projects. 
H1c. Political risk factors at the subnational level have an indirect, significant 
relationship with the success of road infrastructure concession projects. However, one 
hypothesis was rejected. Namely: 
H2. There are significant subnational differences in the influence of political risk 
factors on the success or failure of a road infrastructure concession project developed 
through a public-private partnership. 
On the first question, are political risk factors at the subnational level related to both 
critical success factors for road infrastructure road concession projects and the success of 
these?, it was found that political risk factors were relevant in explaining the success of 
concession infrastructure projects, as there were significant regression weights on both the 
relationship between political risk factors and critical success factors, and the relationship 
between the latter and the success of a project. Moreover, there was also a significant indirect 
effect between political risk factors and success. These relationships seemed to confirm the 
idea that agents seek to minimise their risks by properly identifying them, in turn ensuring 
higher success rates for projects. The former led to accepting the three hypotheses related to 
this question, these being hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. 
However, it must be noted that the relationship showed an opposite direction to the 
one that would be expected from literature (Zhang, 2005; Sachs et al., 2007; Engel et al., 
2009b). That is, it was found that political risk factors exerted a positive effect on both the 
critical success factors and the success of infrastructure projects. On the former, an 
explanation could be found on knowledge and information quality. That is, people from 
locations with infrastructure projects might tend to be from locations where doubts on 
political risk factors could be expressed more freely, due to better knowledge or less political 
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pressures. However, this remains highly speculative. Another study, with more participants, 
would be required to confirm these results, as well as finding out whether this relationship 
holds. 
The second research question, are there subnational differences on the influence of 
political risk factors on the success or failure of an infrastructure roads concession project 
developed through a public-private partnership?, was responded through the use of a one-
way analysis of variance, taking the region most important for the professional activities of 
respondents as the categorical variable and the political risk perception scores obtained from 
the surveys as the continuous variable to be analysed, disaggregating between political risk 
factors. For this section, all factors were taken. The proposed hypothesis mentioned the 
possibility of a gap in political risk incidence due to subnational factors.  
Here, it was found there were no significant differences on the means for political risk 
perceptions between regions, and therefore the null hypothesis must be accepted. This result 
might have been caused by the bias towards the Andean region that was observed in the 
sample, which limited the data available to contrast between regions. Also, such homogeneity 
on risk perceptions might have been caused by centralisation on decision-making processes, 
country size, and the scope of these projects, as well as potential lack of knowledge or 
willingness to mention or discuss political risk factors associated to the subnational division 
in particular, and the possibility of significant variations on the incidence of political risk 
within regions. Due to the above, further research is recommended to confirm or reject the 
existence of said risk gap. 
Practical Implications 
From the results, it was noted that political risk is a factor that influences the success 
or failure of infrastructure roads projects, either through non-performance or cancellations. It 
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was also noted that subnational differences on risk perceptions were not statistically 
significant. According to the former, however, it could be stated that political risk at the 
subnational level can affect the success of a concession infrastructure project, thus meaning it 
must not be ignored. Properly assessing these variations could mean the difference between 
success and failure, thus meaning these must be watched closely. In recommendation section 
I will propose a model for future research about this topic. 
Recent events in Latin America highlighted the importance of proper political risk 
identification and its impact on PPP infrastructure projects in the region. Namely, the 
Odebrecht scandal, involving bribes during infrastructure procurement in countries such as 
Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, among others in Latin America. In turn, a 
greater focus on the nature of legal and bureaucratic risks within the region could help policy-
makers to deliver better transparency policies aimed towards mitigating such risks, both at the 
national and subnational levels of government, through changes in the approach to public 
procurement on infrastructure as a whole.  
Following the results of the current research, the creation of a permanent observatory 
on political risk factors at infrastructure PPP projects is suggested, meant to keep track on the 
importance of these political risk factors and its perception throughout the national territory, 
as well as analysing the continued impact these factors hold on the development of 
infrastructure projects in the country. This arises from the cross-sectional nature of the data, 
with the probability of perceptions changing in time, especially due to the current peace 
process. Negotiations have lasted for seven years, but there seem to be signs that political risk 
factors would mutate even if there are successful negotiations, thus creating a new set of risks 
for infrastructure projects to be taken into account. 
Also, the study could be improved by replicating it in other Colombian regions, or in 
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other developing countries. So far, the sample had to deal with a notorious bias towards the 
Andean region. Including more respondents from the Colombian Caribbean region, for 
example, could show a significant impact on the results regarding the importance of the 
various political risk factors. 
Multiple countries show marked disparities between subnational entities within them, 
on indicators such as productivity, governance, infrastructure quality and corruption. A 
famous example lies in Italy and its North-South divide, but such dynamics also appear in 
developing countries. Exploring the role of such divisions in other developing countries, 
using multiple development indicators, would allow obtaining better information on political 
risk at the subnational level and the role of such disparities on this. 
Finally, throughout the current research, it was assumed and stressed that companies 
and the State consider political risks on the subnational levels at the moment of planning. As 
it has been shown, the political risk seems to bring significant uncertainties, especially at the 
subnational levels. Therefore, suggestions such as more stable regulation, and better project 
stability between multiple political administrations, would help lower risks, thus leading to 
both better profits to the private parties and better final products to the public sector. 
Theoretical Implications 
 From the results, it could be concluded that agency theory serves as a theoretical 
framework adequate for studying PPP infrastructure projects, as the current study focused on 
potentially opportunistic behaviours by the State in these projects, represented in political risk 
factors. The former complements existing literature analysing public-private partnerships 
from agency theory (Vining et al., 2005; Rui et al., 2010), which focused on opportunistic 
behaviour by private parties in these projects. 
 In turn, the study reinforced the importance of clear risk allocation and identification 
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for the success of private participation in the delivery of public services and goods, by 
showing the relationship between political risk factors and critical success factors for a 
project. Such clear risk allocation and analysis of its relationship with project success could 
help mitigate the negative effects of greater complexity derived from PPPs promoted by the 
new public management theory, as mentioned by Dunleavy et al. (2005). 
Finally, another theoretical conclusion comes from the importance of analysing PPP 
projects from the public policy theory, to complement agency theory given its focus on public 
procurement frameworks and political dynamics, and the importance of proper structuring 
processes following both the incrementalist framework (John, 2013) and the new public 
management (Ejea, 2006).  Adopting the principles behind these theories at the subnational 
level could lead to better mitigation of political risk and, therefore, higher success rates.  
Recommendations 
Attending to the limitations the current study had to deal with, as well as on the 
possibility of new research works starting from the current one, the following 
recommendations are delivered for future research. 
 First, there were limitations due to the recent nature of PPPs in the country selected to 
conduct the study, Colombia. A proper study on the latest generation of public-private 
partnerships in Colombia could be conducted as data on these projects becomes available and 
they are allocated. So far, concession projects were used as a proxy, but these represent one 
type of PPP only, ignoring other risk and task distributions between public and private 
sectors. This research cannot be conducted yet, as many PPP projects designed under the 
Ley1508 of 2012 are still under construction or procurement: up to October 2016, of 490 
registered PPP proposals, over 90% were private but fewer less than 2% of them had been 
approved. Public initiatives represent less than 10% of the total, but 54% of them have been 
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approved. It must be mentioned that Ley 1508 of 2012 allows PPP proposals to originate 
from public or private initiatives (unsolicited proposals). 
 Second, additional factors that might influence the success or failure of infrastructure 
projects could be added, such as the political system, compromise with public-private 
partnerships, project-implement ability, and economic development of the country as a 
whole. It could serve as a way to analyse both whether political risk still holds relevant after 
including these variables, and on potential relationships between these variables. 
A third recommendation could be the creation of an expanded statistical model that 
helps to take the decision of developing an infrastructure model or not. That future model 
could include variables as : respondent profile with specific level of experience in PPP and 
level of education, percentage of surveys by region and amount of population, percentage in 
public and private surveys, other kind of PPP projects different than roads, and a study that 
include at least the last the three years, This would be a comprehensive model, including the 
subnational political risk factors mentioned at the current study, which might provide both 
public and private sectors with a quantitative tool to support their decision-making processes. 
Finally, a fourth recommendation consists of continuing the construction of some 
critical success factors for PPP projects mentioned by Michelitsch, et al. (2017), namely: (i) a 
clear and focused PPP strategy; (ii) a critical mass of PPP skills and expertise; (iii) a 
framework that promotes coordinated and collaborative relationships between all parties in a 
PPP project; and (iv) a set of instruments such as PPP knowledge, policies and financing. The 
analysed country, Colombia, has advanced on such factors after the introduction of Ley 1508 
in 2012; and other regulations that develop it law; however, time projects should help the 
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Appendix A: survey sent to experts 




El riesgo político afecta los costos y el éxito o fracaso de las alianzas público-privadas (APP). 
Por medio de las APP, el sector privado participa en la provisión de infraestructura pública. 
Me gustaría invitarlo a participar en una encuesta corta sobre su percepción del impacto del 
riesgo político sobre los resultados de las APP. Por favor envíe también esta encuesta a sus 
colegas que puedan estar interesados en participar. 
Esta encuesta permitirá ejecutar un estudio comparativo entre regiones, departamentos y 
municipios para proyectos de infraestructura vial. Me gustaría invitarlo a que comente sobre 
tantos casos como sea posible en la sección final para obtener conclusiones significativas, así 
como observaciones y comentarios sobre el diseño general de la presente encuesta. 
Será un gusto compartir los resultados de esta encuesta con usted. Por favor comparta los 
siguientes datos para referencia interna y efectuar el envío de estos resultados: 
 Nombre 
 Correo electrónico 
 Cargo 
 Compañía 
 Departamento y municipio 
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Esta encuesta es parte de una investigación doctoral en riesgo político regional y local, y su 
influencia sobre las alianzas público-privadas y concesiones para el caso colombiano. 
La misma ha sido adaptada a partir de aquella utilizada por Tilmann Sachs y Robert L. Tiong, 
a quienes agradecemos por autorizar la adaptación dicho instrumento. Igualmente, 
agradecemos al Doctor Rubén Guevara por validarla y analizar su aplicabilidad al caso 
colombiano. 
Las respuestas suministradas serán consideradas confidenciales, mas su participación en esta 
encuesta le dará acceso a los resultados de la misma, guardando su nombre y el nombre de los 
encuestados. 
En caso de tener alguna duda o inquietud acerca de la encuesta, siéntase libre de comunicarse 
conmigo al teléfono 3144603267, o con Andrés García al teléfono 3222188989, o envíe un 
correo electrónico a la dirección a20118744@pucp.pe.  Igualmente, por favor envíe la 
encuesta  diligenciada antes del 31 de Mayo a dicho correo electrónico, o a la siguiente 
dirección física: 
Transversal 25 # 59-43, Código Postal 111311, envío contraentrega. 
Su aporte a esta encuesta será muy apreciado. 
 
Saludos, 
Rubén Darío Mestizo Reyes 





SUPUESTO CRÍTICO DE LA ENCUESTA 
La encuesta es sobre riesgo político. Se asume que los otros riesgos (técnicos, operacionales, 
de construcción, etc.) son cubiertos de manera exitosa. Además se asume que no se 
encuentran vigentes productos de cobertura crediticia, seguros de riesgo político, garantías u 
otros productos de mitigación de riesgo político, dado que estos cambian la percepción de 
riesgo. 
Se asume que todos los proyectos son proyectos públicos de infraestructura con participación 
privada en diferentes niveles. Estas alianzas público-privadas (APP) pueden incluir múltiples 
tipos de participación privada como DBFO (diseñar, construir, financiar, operar), DBOT 
(diseñar, construir, operar, transferir), BOT (construir, operar, transferir), BLT (construir, 
arrendar, transferir), DBOT (diseñar, construir, operar, transferir), BOO (diseñar, poseer, 
operar) y DCMF (diseñar, construir, administrar, financiar), entre otras. 
Para el caso colombiano destaca el caso de las concesiones, de las cuales se han ejecutado 
múltiples en el sector de infraestructura vial en las últimas décadas, siendo la forma 
predilecta de contratación antes de la Ley 1508/12, la cual reglamentó las APP en el país e 
instituyó el uso de esta figura para proyectos por encima de un monto establecido. 
Escala de la encuesta 
Se le pedirá a los entrevistados que escriban sus respuestas utilizando un porcentaje de 
relevancia que indique su percepción. A modo de guía, los siguientes rangos indican el nivel 
de importancia para cada uno de los factores de riesgo político. Siéntase libre de usar 




Escala Grado de  relevancia 




80%-100% Muy alto 
DEFINICIONES DE LA ENCUESTA PARA EL RIESGO POLÍTICO 
 
A: Inconvertibilidad y transferencia de divisas 
“Inconvertibilidad y transferencia de divisas” se refiere a la introducción por parte del 
gobierno anfitrión de restricciones en la transferencia de moneda afuera del país y su 
conversión a una divisa, incluyendo el fracaso del gobierno anfitrión en responder a una 
solicitud de este tipo de transferencia en un tiempo razonable. 
B: Expropiación 
“Expropiación” se refiere a cualquier acto administrativo o legislativo del gobierno anfitrión 
con el efecto de quitarle al inversionista del control o de un beneficio importante de su 
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inversión, con la excepción de medidas no discriminatorias de aplicación general. 
C: Brecha de contrato 
“Brecha de contrato” es cualquier repudio o brecha por parte del gobierno anfitrión en caso 
que (a) no haya acceso a un foro judicial o arbitral para resolver la disputa o (b) una decisión 
en dicha disputa no sea entregada en un periodo razonable de tiempo o (c) dicha decisión no 
pueda ser cumplida. 
D: Violencia política 
“Violencia política” hace referencia a actos en el país como guerra, insurrección, disturbios 
civiles, terrorismo, sabotaje, y actos de desorden de terratenientes o indígenas. 
E: Riesgo legal, regulatorio y burocrático 
“Riesgo legal, regulatorio y burocrático” hace referencia a los riesgos dentro del proceso 
administrativo que no pueden ser atribuídos a alguno de los riesgos mencionados 
previamente. Algunos ejemplos son el cumplimiento y ejecución de leyes, conflictos de 
autoridad, corrupción, transparencia, problemas al emitir permisos y consentimientos, 
cambios de gobierno llevando a cambios en las leyes, políticas e impuestos, y obstrucciones 
durante procesos de arbitramento. 
F: Riesgo por acciones no gubernamentales 
“Riesgo por acciones no gubernamentales” incluye aquellos en los cuales el gobierno no tiene 
influencia directa y no caen en ninguna de las categorías ya mencionadas. Estos incluyen 
activistas sindicales y ambientales, fundamentalismo religioso y tensiones étnicas, 




Glosario de términos 
 TIR: Tasa interna de retorno. Tasa utilizada para comparar la rentabilidad entre 
proyectos. Entre más alta, se espera una mayor rentabilidad para un proyecto. 
 RCSD: Ratio de cobertura de servicio de deuda, indica la capacidad de la empresa 
para cumplir con sus obligaciones financieras. Se obtiene al dividir el flujo de caja 
disponible anual sobre el servicio de deuda anual. 
 Riesgo marginal: indica la variación de riesgo que se observa por variaciones en los 
montos prestados para el desarrollo de un proyecto. 
 Costo de seguros: indica el costo por una cobertura por un monto dado ante un cierto 
tipo de riesgo. A mayor riesgo, mayor el costo. 
Preguntas generales para determinar el riesgo político en regiones 
1. Información sobre el entrevistado (por favor marcar, múltiple respuesta) 
Sector para el cual está involucrado en proyectos de infraestructura 
Público  
Privado  
Área de trabajo 
Inversionista  
Sistema financiero  
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Compañía de aseguramiento  
Consultor profesional  
Contratista/constructor  
Estructurador de proyectos  
Departamento contractual de proyectos de infraestructura  
Ubicado en 
Región Andina  
Región Caribe  
Región Pacífico  
Región Orinoquia  
Región Amazonia  
2. Oportunidades de APP en el país Colombia 
2a. ¿Cuál es el impacto negativo de estos factores de riesgo sobre las oportunidades de APP 
en el país? Utilizar los porcentajes mencionados en la página 2. 
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Factores de riesgo A. Inconvertibilidad y 
transferencia de divisas 
 
B. Expropiación  
C. Brecha de contrato  
D. Violencia política  
E. Riesgo legal, burocrático 
y regulatorio. 
 
F. Riesgo por acciones no 
gubernamentales. 
 
Otros factores, especificar.  
2b. ¿Cuántas oportunidades de APP ve en los próximos años? Utilizar los porcentajes 
mencionados en la página 2. 






3. Oportunidades de APP 
por sectores 
Infraestructura vial 
Andina Caribe Pacífico Orinoquia Amazonia 
3a. ¿Cuál es el impacto negativo de estos factores de riesgo sobre las oportunidades de APP 

















     
B. Expropiación      




   
D. Violencia 
política 
     
E. Riesgo legal, 
burocrático y 
regulatorio. 
     
F. Riesgo por 
acciones no 
gubernamentales. 
     
Otros factores, 
especificar. 
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2015      
2016-2017      
2018-2020      
2020-2025      
4. Riesgo y rentabilidad (por favor marcar) Cierto Falso 
1. Si el riesgo político percibido aumenta, el monto de la inversión 
disminuye. 
  
2. Si el riesgo político percibido aumenta, la TIR esperada 
aumentará. 
  
3. Si el riesgo político percibido aumenta, el RCSD mínimo anual 
aumentará. 
  
4. Si el riesgo político percibido aumenta, el riesgo marginal de un 
préstamo aumentará 
  
5. Si el riesgo político percibido aumenta, el costo de los seguros 
aumentará. 
  
6. Hay correlación cero o negativa entre el riesgo marginal de los 
préstamos y el costo de los seguros. 
  
7. Con una menor participación de patrimonio, el riesgo marginal de   
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un préstamo a un proyecto aumentará. 




Por favor ingrese sus comentarios sobre: 
 Oportunidades de APP en el país: 
 
 
 Oportunidades de APP por sectores: 
 
 
 ¿Dónde espera las mayores oportunidades de APP en 2015 y los años venideros? 
 
 
 Apreciaciones personales sobre los factores de riesgo más relevantes. 
 
 
































Appendix C: AMOS outputs 
Notes for Model (Default model) 
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 65 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 31 
Degrees of freedom (65 - 31): 34 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 44,467 
Degrees of freedom = 34 
Probability level = ,108 







CSF <--- PRF 7,935 ,177 1,122 ,869 ,251 
DummyPIR <--- CSF ,007 ,000 ,028 ,001 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental <--- PRF 55,688 1,245 8,099 6,498 1,761 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato <--- PRF 89,185 1,994 12,387 10,242 2,820 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica <--- PRF 55,835 1,249 8,482 6,628 1,766 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior <--- PRF ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático <--- PRF 82,139 1,837 11,487 9,412 2,597 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales <--- PRF 61,416 1,373 8,555 7,120 1,942 
IGA_R <--- CSF ,164 ,004 -,281 ,013 ,005 
CartPC_R <--- CSF ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000 
Hur100R <--- CSF 3,522 ,079 17,535 ,199 ,111 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
CSF <--- PRF ,135 ,003 ,307 -,021 ,004 
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Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
DummyPIR <--- CSF ,102 ,002 ,552 ,004 ,003 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental <--- PRF ,092 ,002 ,631 ,002 ,003 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato <--- PRF ,079 ,002 ,774 -,004 ,002 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica <--- PRF ,095 ,002 ,703 ,002 ,003 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior <--- PRF ,145 ,003 ,341 ,000 ,005 
Riesgolegalyburocrático <--- PRF ,070 ,002 ,807 -,004 ,002 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales <--- PRF ,098 ,002 ,590 -,001 ,003 
IGA_R <--- CSF ,146 ,003 -,250 ,008 ,005 
CartPC_R <--- CSF ,076 ,002 ,902 ,005 ,002 
Hur100R <--- CSF ,094 ,002 ,884 ,002 ,003 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
DummyPIR 
  
,051 ,001 ,250 ,004 ,002 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 
  
3,730 ,083 47,090 ,035 ,118 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 
  
3,288 ,074 38,191 -,056 ,104 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 
  
3,834 ,086 54,568 -,062 ,121 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 
  
3,496 ,078 50,948 ,092 ,111 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 
  
3,461 ,077 63,133 -,045 ,109 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 
  
3,202 ,072 40,594 ,005 ,101 
IGA_R 
  
1,093 ,024 69,264 -,035 ,035 
CartPC_R 
  
1,096 ,025 8,870 ,063 ,035 
Hur100R 
  
19,609 ,438 176,042 1,070 ,620 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
ePRF 
  
103,716 2,319 141,447 20,631 3,280 
eCSF 
  
14,223 ,318 65,564 1,138 ,450 
eRIX 
  
140,816 3,149 895,269 -24,651 4,453 
eEXP 
  
80,769 1,806 462,180 -9,928 2,554 
eRVP 
  
111,765 2,499 418,058 -11,215 3,534 
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Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
eRLB 
  
78,144 1,747 267,662 -4,613 2,471 
eANG 
  
78,190 1,748 450,806 -12,724 2,473 
eHUR 
  
4957,538 110,854 5985,252 -172,659 156,771 
eCAR 
  
12,114 ,271 16,007 -1,525 ,383 
eIGA 
  
17,082 ,382 86,729 -1,037 ,540 
eRBC 
  
108,481 2,426 360,846 -3,058 3,430 
eProject 
  
,023 ,001 ,127 -,003 ,001 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
PRF 
  
,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
CSF 
  
,084 ,002 ,112 ,005 ,003 
Hur100R 
  
,169 ,004 ,791 ,012 ,005 
CartPC_R 
  
,136 ,003 ,819 ,014 ,004 
IGA_R 
  
,078 ,002 ,084 ,017 ,002 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 
  
,112 ,003 ,357 ,008 ,004 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 
  
,109 ,002 ,656 -,001 ,003 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 
  
,100 ,002 ,137 ,021 ,003 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 
  
,132 ,003 ,503 ,011 ,004 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 
  
,117 ,003 ,605 ,001 ,004 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 
  
,112 ,003 ,407 ,010 ,004 
DummyPIR 
  
,113 ,003 ,315 ,015 ,004 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF 7,935 ,000 
Hur100R 120,641 3,522 
CartPC_R 7,935 ,000 
IGA_R 1,421 ,164 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 61,416 ,000 





Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 55,835 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 89,185 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 55,688 ,000 
DummyPIR ,207 ,007 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,135 ,000 
Hur100R ,118 ,094 
CartPC_R ,127 ,076 
IGA_R ,064 ,146 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,098 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,070 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,145 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,095 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,079 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,092 ,000 
DummyPIR ,076 ,102 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF 7,935 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 3,522 
CartPC_R ,000 ,000 
IGA_R ,000 ,164 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 61,416 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 82,139 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 55,835 ,000 





Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 55,688 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,007 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,135 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 ,094 
CartPC_R ,000 ,076 
IGA_R ,000 ,146 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,098 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,070 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,145 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,095 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,079 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,092 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,102 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R 120,641 ,000 
CartPC_R 7,935 ,000 
IGA_R 1,421 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 







CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R ,118 ,000 
CartPC_R ,127 ,000 
IGA_R ,064 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 
DummyPIR ,076 ,000 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
CSF <--- PRF ,253 ,031 3,887 ,020 
DummyPIR <--- CSF ,028 ,016 ,043 ,002 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental <--- PRF 1,601 ,866 15,631 ,002 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato <--- PRF 2,145 1,056 26,099 ,002 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica <--- PRF 1,854 1,100 19,473 ,002 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior <--- PRF 1,000 1,000 1,000 ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático <--- PRF 2,075 1,057 22,539 ,002 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales <--- PRF 1,435 ,649 18,919 ,002 
IGA_R <--- CSF -,294 -,605 ,010 ,061 
CartPC_R <--- CSF 1,000 1,000 1,000 ... 
Hur100R <--- CSF 17,336 11,727 26,042 ,002 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
CSF <--- PRF ,327 ,059 ,585 ,014 
DummyPIR <--- CSF ,549 ,341 ,744 ,003 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental <--- PRF ,629 ,414 ,783 ,003 
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Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato <--- PRF ,777 ,554 ,891 ,003 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica <--- PRF ,701 ,490 ,869 ,003 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior <--- PRF ,341 ,031 ,602 ,003 
Riesgolegalyburocrático <--- PRF ,810 ,624 ,909 ,003 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales <--- PRF ,591 ,354 ,750 ,003 
IGA_R <--- CSF -,258 -,553 ,011 ,062 
CartPC_R <--- CSF ,897 ,714 1,035 ,004 
Hur100R <--- CSF ,883 ,691 1,066 ,002 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
DummyPIR 
  
,247 ,151 ,342 ,003 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 
  
47,055 39,672 54,163 ,002 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 
  
38,247 31,767 44,509 ,002 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 
  
54,630 46,579 61,959 ,002 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 
  
50,856 43,789 57,206 ,003 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 
  
63,178 56,397 69,861 ,002 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 
  
40,589 34,589 47,211 ,002 
IGA_R 
  
69,299 67,188 71,328 ,002 
CartPC_R 
  
8,808 6,695 10,881 ,004 
Hur100R 
  
174,972 136,788 214,244 ,003 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
ePRF 
  
120,817 1,026 389,918 ,002 
eCSF 
  
64,426 42,299 97,817 ,002 
eRIX 
  
919,920 645,880 1177,613 ,001 
eEXP 
  
472,108 324,272 642,685 ,001 
eRVP 
  
429,273 192,270 634,558 ,001 
eRLB 
  
272,275 142,537 473,436 ,001 
eANG 
  
463,530 322,351 636,242 ,001 
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Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
eHUR 
  
6157,911 -3246,326 15868,305 ,175 
eCAR 
  
17,532 -5,900 42,091 ,095 
eIGA 
  
87,765 57,941 126,160 ,001 
eRBC 
  
363,904 196,565 632,688 ,001 
eProject 
  
,130 ,085 ,179 ,001 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
PRF 
  
,000 ,000 ,000 ... 
CSF 
  
,107 ,005 ,343 ,001 
Hur100R 
  
,779 ,478 1,136 ,002 
CartPC_R 
  
,805 ,510 1,071 ,004 
IGA_R 
  
,067 ,001 ,305 ,002 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 
  
,349 ,125 ,563 ,003 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 
  
,656 ,390 ,827 ,003 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 
  
,116 ,001 ,363 ,003 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 
  
,492 ,240 ,755 ,003 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 
  
,604 ,306 ,794 ,003 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 
  
,396 ,171 ,613 ,003 
DummyPIR 
  
,301 ,117 ,553 ,003 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,031 ,000 
Hur100R ,937 11,727 
CartPC_R ,031 1,000 
IGA_R -,738 -,605 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,649 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 1,057 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 1,000 ,000 





Riesgodebrechadecontrato 1,056 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,866 ,000 
DummyPIR ,001 ,016 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF 3,887 ,000 
Hur100R 328,644 26,042 
CartPC_R 3,887 1,000 
IGA_R ,002 ,010 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 18,919 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 22,539 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 1,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 19,473 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 26,099 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 15,631 ,000 
DummyPIR ,215 ,043 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,020 ... 
Hur100R ,013 ,002 
CartPC_R ,020 ... 
IGA_R ,061 ,061 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,002 ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,002 ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ... ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,002 ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,002 ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,002 ... 





CSF ,059 ,000 
Hur100R ,068 ,691 
CartPC_R ,036 ,714 
IGA_R -,276 -,553 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,354 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,624 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,031 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,490 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,554 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,414 ,000 
DummyPIR ,034 ,341 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,585 ,000 
Hur100R ,518 1,066 
CartPC_R ,534 1,035 
IGA_R -,003 ,011 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,750 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,909 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,602 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,869 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,891 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,783 ,000 
DummyPIR ,347 ,744 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,014 ... 
Hur100R ,012 ,002 





IGA_R ,040 ,062 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,003 ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,003 ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,003 ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,003 ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,003 ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,003 ... 
DummyPIR ,013 ,003 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,031 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 11,727 
CartPC_R ,000 1,000 
IGA_R ,000 -,605 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,649 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático 1,057 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 1,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 1,100 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 1,056 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,866 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,016 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF 3,887 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 26,042 
CartPC_R ,000 1,000 
IGA_R ,000 ,010 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales 18,919 ,000 





Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior 1,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica 19,473 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato 26,099 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 15,631 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,043 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,020 ... 
Hur100R ... ,002 
CartPC_R ... ... 
IGA_R ... ,061 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,002 ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,002 ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ... ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,002 ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,002 ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,002 ... 
DummyPIR ... ,002 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,059 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 ,691 
CartPC_R ,000 ,714 
IGA_R ,000 -,553 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,354 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,624 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,031 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,490 ,000 





Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,414 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,341 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,585 ,000 
Hur100R ,000 1,066 
CartPC_R ,000 1,035 
IGA_R ,000 ,011 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,750 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,909 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,602 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,869 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,891 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,783 ,000 
DummyPIR ,000 ,744 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,014 ... 
Hur100R ... ,002 
CartPC_R ... ,004 
IGA_R ... ,062 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,003 ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,003 ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,003 ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,003 ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,003 ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,003 ... 







CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R ,937 ,000 
CartPC_R ,031 ,000 
IGA_R -,738 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 
DummyPIR ,001 ,000 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R 328,644 ,000 
CartPC_R 3,887 ,000 
IGA_R ,002 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 
DummyPIR ,215 ,000 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ... ... 
Hur100R ,013 ... 





IGA_R ,061 ... 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ... ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ... ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ... ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ... ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ... ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ... ... 
DummyPIR ,017 ... 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R ,068 ,000 
CartPC_R ,036 ,000 
IGA_R -,276 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 
DummyPIR ,034 ,000 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ,000 ,000 
Hur100R ,518 ,000 
CartPC_R ,534 ,000 
IGA_R -,003 ,000 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ,000 ,000 





Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ,000 ,000 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ,000 ,000 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ,000 ,000 
DummyPIR ,347 ,000 
 
PRF CSF 
CSF ... ... 
Hur100R ,012 ... 
CartPC_R ,018 ... 
IGA_R ,040 ... 
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales ... ... 
Riesgolegalyburocrático ... ... 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior ... ... 
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica ... ... 
Riesgodebrechadecontrato ... ... 
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental ... ... 
DummyPIR ,013 ... 
Iterations Method 0 Method 1 Method 2 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 
5 0 0 3 
6 0 0 5 
7 0 0 6 
8 0 0 5 
9 0 0 1 
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Iterations Method 0 Method 1 Method 2 
10 0 0 3 
11 0 0 0 
12 0 4 4 
13 0 6 0 
14 0 15 2 
15 0 36 0 
16 0 51 1 
17 0 63 2 
18 0 75 5 
19 0 658 54 

















N = 1000 103,232 |************ 
Mean = 88,481  113,146 |********* 































N = 1000 173,290 |* 
Mean = 74,787  191,633 | 





























N = 1000 169,376 |***** 
Mean = 65,226  206,165 |** 































N = 1000 177,067 |* 
Mean = 74,137  200,713 |* 































N = 1000 173,290 |* 
Mean = 74,787  191,633 | 













Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 31 44,467 34 ,108 1,308 
Saturated model 65 ,000 0 
  











Default model ,841 ,789 ,957 ,941 ,955 





Independence model ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model ,756 ,635 ,722 
Saturated model ,000 ,000 ,000 
Independence model 1,000 ,000 ,000 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 10,467 ,000 31,856 
Saturated model ,000 ,000 ,000 
Independence model 234,426 185,396 290,959 
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Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model ,618 ,145 ,000 ,442 
Saturated model ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
Independence model 3,881 3,256 2,575 4,041 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model ,065 ,000 ,114 ,303 
Independence model ,269 ,239 ,300 ,000 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 106,467 117,648 
  
Saturated model 130,000 153,443 
  
Independence model 319,426 326,639 
  
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 1,479 1,333 1,776 1,634 
Saturated model 1,806 1,806 1,806 2,131 






Default model 79 91 









Appendix D: SPSS outputs 
 
GET 
  FILE='D:\Documents\BOP Consultoria\Tesis RM\R5.sav'. 
DATASET NAME ConjuntoDatos1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
ONEWAY Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransferenciasdedineroalexterior Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernamental 
    Riesgodebrechadecontrato Riesgodeviolenciapolítica Riesgolegalyburocrático 
    Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamentales BY Región 







cuadrados gl Media cuadrática F Sig. 
Riesgodeinconvertibilidadytransfer
enciasdedineroalexterior 
Entre grupos 3691,225 4 922,806 ,868 ,488 
Dentro de grupos 72282,556 68 1062,979   
Total 75973,781 72    
Riesgodeexpropiacióngubernament
al 
Entre grupos 1975,840 4 493,960 ,610 ,657 
Dentro de grupos 55091,722 68 810,172   
Total 57067,562 72    
Riesgodebrechadecontrato Entre grupos 1565,326 4 391,332 ,406 ,804 
Dentro de grupos 65583,687 68 964,466   
Total 67149,014 72    
Riesgodeviolenciapolítica Entre grupos 5294,647 4 1323,662 1,597 ,185 
Dentro de grupos 56346,093 68 828,619   
Total 61640,740 72    
Riesgolegalyburocrático Entre grupos 4295,324 4 1073,831 1,363 ,256 
Dentro de grupos 53567,361 68 787,755   
Total 57862,685 72    
Riesgoporaccionesnogubernamenta
les 
Entre grupos 1503,241 4 375,810 ,506 ,731 
Dentro de grupos 50490,430 68 742,506   
Total 51993,671 72    
 
 
 
